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FOREWORD 
he emerging challenge of Critical (information) Infrastructure 
Protection (C(I)IP) has been recognized by nearly all member states 
of the European Union, following the pioneering experience of the 
United States. More generally, politicians are increasingly aware of the 
threats presented by radical political movements and terrorist attacks. 
Responses to these facts have been in line with the available resources and 
possibilities of each country, so that the UK, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy for example, are already quite 
advanced in translating the C(I)IP challenge into measures, whereas other 
member states are lagging behind but trying to accelerate their own 
internal policy process in the direction of a mature C(I)IP policy.  
In the international arena of this policy domain, Europe is still in 
search of a role to play. The EU is supporting the C(I)IP community with 
research projects, a first pan-European exercise and a unit in the European 
Commission DG Information Society, which supports the policy process 
very pro-actively. The European Commission is entrusted with the task of 
promoting awareness of this important topic, facilitating cooperation 
between member states, fostering the exchange of know-how and coaching 
the MS in their efforts. For all these tasks, trust and confidence are crucial: 
these, however, are properties that only develop with time and mutual 
cooperation. Efficiency and quality are necessary to use the scarce resources 
available in the most cost-effective way. Only with due attention to the 
issues of trust and efficiency can we set up a stable partnership with the 
potential to contribute to better policy-making. In all of this, the EC can 
contribute significantly to the acceleration of the overall process by steering 
the direction of the much-needed cooperation.  
Since the most important factors in the whole picture – trust and 
confidence – grow with time and experience and cannot be the result of 
mere top-down commands by EU institutions, upfront regulation is very 
unlikely to work: on the contrary, helping the development of a community 
and a successful partnership between national governments is much more 
likely to succeed. Fortunately, the Commission can count on the past 
experience of some national governments that have adopted a similar 
‘facilitating’ approach. This way of handling such a complex task avoids 
fear, uncertainty and obstruction and also generates excitement and 
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PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
IN THE EU 
CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT 
MAIN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. A thorough subsidiarity test should be performed for each economic 
sector. The increasing interdependence between infrastructures and 
between countries, as well as the inter-links between physical 
infrastructure and the information infrastructure create a compelling 
argument for the coordination of CIP policy at international level. The 
European Commission should thus perform a thorough subsidiarity 
test to identify areas where joint action is more desirable, and areas that 
may remain under national competence in C(I)IP policy. The test 
should be run for each of the economic sectors involved. 
2. One single EU top-level agency. The EU must adopt an all-hazards 
approach by empowering – in line with a consolidated trend in many 
countries – a single agency to deal with CIP and CIIP issues. The 
agency’s mandate should include both preparedness and response 
coordination, including an EU hotline for emergency management and 
early warnings. 
3. Increase policy and operational focus on resilience and preparedness. 
The need to protect critical infrastructures (CIs), including critical 
information infrastructure (CII), must be fully understood by policy-
makers, as awareness of this policy issue leads to a paradigm shift in 
the way we think about infrastructure policy-making. 
4. Build a long-term CIP strategy for EU. The EU needs a forward-
looking well defined strategy, and strong political commitment. The 
strategy should include key pillars such as the development of best 
practices, education exercises and training, the promotion of R&D and 
fostering information-sharing between public and private operators 
and suppliers. The fact that suppliers are often global players, while 
public policy-makers act at a local level, makes the policy dialogue 
more difficult and international coordination even more important. 
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5. Foster trust between information-sharing partners. Public-private-
partnership (PPPs) are a good way to facilitate trusted information-
sharing among the key EU stakeholders; however, given the unique 
challenge posed by the need to coordinate the approach across the EU 
27, it needs to be carefully planned and orchestrated. It needs time, 
clear rules, sector-specific arrangements and sharing units of limited 
size: this issue needs to be addressed upfront and carefully in order to 
ensure successful international and EU-level cooperation.  
6. Develop common approaches for C(I)I risk assessment based on the 
ongoing production of data and relevant information. The EU should 
promote the development and adoption of common risk metrics and 
standardized approaches for risk identification, assessment and 
management in the field of CIP. This cannot be an EU-level effort only, 
since it requires, inter alia, the constant production of data and statistics 
at national level. Without the availability of reliable data, a meaningful 
and thorough approach to CIP is not feasible.  
7. Adopt a ‘new approach’ for industry-government cooperation. The EU 
should adopt a flexible approach to CIP policy, by establishing, through 
primary legislation, only the general principles and main outcomes 
sought through EU CIP policy, and leaving it to the industry to devise 
the best technical measures that fulfil the desired levels of resilience.  
8. Integrate CIP into the EU policy-making processes. Impacts on CI 
resilience should be introduced as a mandatory step in the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment system, whenever the policy issue in 
hand potentially affects, even indirectly, the resilience or vulnerability 
of CIs.  
9. Develop policy validation methodologies. Methodologies to stress-test 
existing policies should be developed through public funding of ad hoc 
research projects. In particular, these projects should look at how to test 
interdependencies between CIs and potential cascading effects 
triggered by failures of given infrastructures, based on models or 
simulation games.  
10. Establish indicators and criteria for success. Criteria and indicators to 
assess the outcomes of national and EU-wide information-sharing 
initiatives are needed, in order to allow the tracking of progress 
towards common, coordinated goals in CIP policy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he European Union and its member states face very unique 
challenges in critical infrastructure protection (CIP) policy. In the 
past few years, the European Commission has adopted a number of 
policy initiatives in this field, including Directives and Communications to 
promote the enhancement of preparedness, security and resilience. 
However, a number of outstanding problems remain. First, member states 
are at varying degrees of maturity with respect to the development of a 
comprehensive and effective CIP policy. Second, there are islands of 
cooperation across the EU member states but no overall concept of 
operations at the EU level. Third, partnerships and relationships are 
scattered across countries (each individual country has and will maintain 
unique relationships with private sector owner operators and global 
companies that enable them). Fourth, critical EU infrastructure is also 
scattered across many different countries.  
Critical infrastructures (energy, 
communications, banking, transportation, 
public government services, etc.) are now more 
vital to industrialised economies. Citizens, 
businesses and governments all rely on an 
array of interlinked physical and information 
infrastructures to satisfy their needs and 
perform their daily operations. At the same time, these infrastructures are 
becoming increasingly interdependent, such that failure of one of them can 
often propagate and result in domino effects. Suffice it to recall the recent 
failures of the electricity grids in November 2006 in Western Europe, when 
a shutdown of a high-voltage line in Germany resulted in massive power 
failures in France and Italy, as well as in parts of Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, even extending as far as Morocco and 
affecting ten million customers in total. In addition, some of these 
infrastructures can also trigger cross-border effects, due to their inherently 
regional or global nature (as in the case of energy sources or the internet). 
This means that for some modern infrastructures, the failure to reach 
sufficient resilience standards in one country can have a detrimental effect 
on many others.  
T
Infrastructures are becoming 
increasingly important in our 
economies, making risk 
issues as important as 
efficiency. This needs to be 
reflected in our economic 
policies 
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Recent dramatic episodes, from 9/11 to 
the Madrid train bombings, the power cuts in 
North America in 2003, the April 2010 ash 
cloud, the Louisiana 2010 oil spill and the 
cyber-attacks in Estonia in 2007, have 
highlighted the need for a comprehensive, 
internationally coordinated policy for the protection of critical 
infrastructures. For the purposes of this report, we define critical 
infrastructure as infrastructure whose failure would result in substantial 
damage to society and/or the economy. The magnitude and heterogeneous 
causes of these events has led to the development of all-hazard approaches 
to policy in many countries, in order to account for both natural disasters 
and man-made attacks when conceiving prevention and remediation 
measures against the risk of infrastructure failure. With this in mind, 
several countries have put in place a policy for critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP) and also critical information infrastructure protection 
(CIIP). However, the landscape of these national policies is still very 
fragmented, and the same can be said for that of the EU, where the 
European Commission is still attempting to devise a more coordinated 
policy.  
This report contains the opinions expressed by participants of the 
CEPS Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Protection as regards future 
policy directions in this topical and ever-more important field. There was 
agreement among Task Force participants that the EU can play a leading 
role in facilitating global cooperation. In particular, the European Public-
Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) presents a key opportunity for 
Europe to engage the local and global industry players in guiding and 
reviewing important aspects of emerging cyber policy. This is likely to 
result in the application of effective policy levers, ensuring that emerging 
technologies are well addressed, and that there is alignment with other 
similar initiatives outside the EU. In this respect, Europe can also act as a 
model for the rest of the world. 
The findings that emerged during Task Force meetings can be 
summarized as follows: 
• The need to protect critical infrastructure is 
real, and potentially determines a trade-off 
between (short-term) efficiency and resilience, 
which must be addressed by policy-
makers when making choices. The 
Recent episodes have 
highlighted the need for 
internationally coordinated 
CIP policy. But the current 
landscape is still very 
fragmented, also in the EU 
CIP policy features very 
peculiar economic problems, 
from externalities to rational 
ignorance and bounded 
rationality issues, all calling 
for public intervention 
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economics of CIP features important specificities, including the need 
to solve potential dilemmas identified in our report, such as the 
‘efficiency-security trade-off’ and principal-agent problems. CIs often 
exhibit positive and negative externalities that lead to market failure. 
In addition, the CEPS Task Force debated the difficult role of liability 
and insurance, as well as behavioural problems related to rational 
ignorance and bounded rationality. All these issues call for a 
coordinated public-private action. 
• There is no way to organise a meaningful CIP policy without involving the 
private sector, as CIs in Europe are mostly owned by private players, 
many of which are worldwide operating companies. 
• The key foundations of a CIP policy are a widely communicated vision and a 
forward-looking strategy, coupled with strong political commitment. The 
key pillars are then the identification of gaps in the development of 
standards and best practices, strengthening education and training 
for the development of new professional skills in the CIP domain, the 
promotion and support of R&D for the development of improved CI 
protection technologies and methods, and information-sharing. 
Operationally, the key phases of the CIP cycle are often identified as 
follows: i) analysis and assessment; ii) remediation; and (iii) 
indications and warnings, before the adverse event occurs. In 
addition, they include iv) mitigation; v) incident response; and (vi) 
reconstitution, after the event (or succession of events) has occurred. 
Trust is a key dimension in any information-sharing exercise and 
should be addressed by CIP policy, knowing that building trust 
needs time, clear rules, sector-specific arrangements and limited 
group size. 
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• At national level, CIP policy: i) focused on resilience and an all-hazards 
approach; ii) is centralised in a limited number of bodies; and iii) is inclusive 
of the cyber-dimension. The role of critical information infrastructure 
and its relevance for CIP policy is on the increase, also leading to 
more interplay between cyber-security and CIP policy. The increasing 
reliance of physical Critical Infrastructures on ICT and the increasing 
importance of the internet and associated 
services to society and the economy 
gradually change the threat landscape. 
Increasingly, local CIs are affected by 
global cyber threats. In addition, our 
understanding of the causes of failure of 
(or attack to) infrastructure is still limited, in particular when it comes 
to infrastructure interdependency and cross-country effects. Finally, 
greater risk seems to be arising from unexpected and highly 
unpredictable causes (the so-called ‘black swans’ problem), which 
creates significant challenges, and may require even greater efforts in 
securing efficient mitigation and response. 
• There is a clear need for establishing a more holistic approach, a common 
taxonomy, metrics and a common risk management framework for CIP-
related risks and threats. Standardisation in this domain – also relying 
on existing standards from ISO, NIST and ANSI, for example, – 
would significantly improve the circulation of best practices and the 
development of a mature insurance market. Moreover, the 
production of data at national and sectoral level is crucial for the 
development of guidance on risk management and CIP for public 
and private authorities. Furthermore, in the area of security 
standards, where extensive work was already carried out by standard 
bodies as well as specific sectors like defence, health, and finance: 
recent surveys demonstrate that a comprehensive vision of security is 
still lacking, and technical standards do not often interact sufficiently 
with sector-specific models.  
• Different sectors have different needs when it comes to CIP policy. For 
example, coupling national public-private-partnerships (PPPs) with a 
global partnership and intelligence centre in the financial sector 
would provide a compelling mechanism to increase the resilience of 
the financial infrastructure. However, global action is hampered by 
the heterogeneity of potential participants, as well as conflicting 
interests, diverging knowledge bases and high transaction costs. For 
There are structural biases 
between attack and defence 
in CIP: this calls for 
information‐sharing and the 
promotion of common 
standards and metrics 
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example, in the energy sector, security of supply, climate and 
environmental concerns and the need to secure the affordability of 
energy for residential and business customers form a peculiar 
‘trilemma’ that must be solved by carefully accounting for all the 
interests and incentives at stake. In the IT sector, the impact of 
quickly evolving and emerging technologies must be assessed on the 
resilience of critical services and dependent critical infrastructures.  
Against this background, EU member states are still pursuing 
fragmented C(I)IP policies, and there is still a significant lack of cooperation 
between national governments and EU institutions in setting up a 
coordinated emergency response to potential threats. In other words, the 
higher degree of risk to which we expose our daily activities is not 
mirrored by an increased response potential of EU institutions. Yet member 
states are indeed interdependent: even if the internet backbone is not 
evenly spread over the EU27, several critical infrastructures are cross-
border infrastructures, and for those the weakest links – i.e. the countries 
with a weaker emergency response potential – affect the vulnerability of all 
countries. For example, if 26 out of 27 countries have sufficiently strong 
policies to protect the internet backbone or challenge the spread of 
malware, this is not enough to guarantee the resilience of the internet 
network in the EU. It takes no more than one country to disrupt the whole 
system and expose it to threats. 
With this in mind, the policy recommendations of the CEPS Task 
Force are aimed at the future directions that EU policy should take as 
regards critical infrastructure protection. There was agreement among Task 
Force participants that the EU can play a leading role in facilitating global 
cooperation. In particular, the European Public-Private Partnership for 
Resilience (EP3R) presents a key opportunity for Europe to engage the local 
and global industry players in guiding and reviewing important aspects of 
emerging cyber policy. This is likely to result in the application of effective 
policy levers, ensuring that emerging technologies are well addressed, and 
ensuring alignment with other similar initiatives outside the EU. In this 
respect, Europe can also act as a model for the rest of the world.  
In particular, we recommend the following actions at the EU level: 
• The European Commission should perform a thorough subsidiarity 
test to clearly identify areas where acting jointly is more desirable, 
and areas that may remain under national competence in C(I)IP 
policy. The test should focus on available policy options in each 
sector and for the overall governance of the system, including the 
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creation of a European institute for the coordination of CIP and CIIP 
in Europe, or the creation of an EU early-warning centre.  
• The EU must adopt an all-hazards approach by empowering – in line 
with a consolidated trend in many countries – a single agency to deal 
with CIP and CIIP issues; and launching an EU number for 
emergency management and early warnings, operated by the same 
agency. 
• The EU should promote the development and adoption of common 
risk metrics and standards for risk identification, assessment and 
management in the field of CIP. This will enable a broader choice of 
incentives to improve CIP, will contribute to the greater availability 
of data and possibly also to a more mature insurance market. 
• The EU should adopt a flexible approach to CIP policy, by 
establishing through primary legislation only the general principles 
and main outcomes sought through EU CIP policy, and leaving it to 
the industry to devise the best technical measures that fulfil the 
desired levels of resilience.  
• Impacts on CI resilience should be introduced as a mandatory step in 
the Commission’s Impact Assessment system, whenever the policy 
issue at hand potentially affects, even if indirectly, the resilience or 
vulnerability of CIs.  
• Methodologies to test existing policies with respect to CIP goals 
should be developed through public funding of ad hoc research 
projects. In particular, these projects should look at how to model 
interdependencies between CIs and potential cascading effects 
triggered by failures of given infrastructures based on models or 
simulation games. 
• Models of interdependency between CIs and potential cascading 
effects triggered by failures of given infrastructures have already 
been researched to a certain degree. However, a more detailed 
analysis should be performed, including a technology assessment of 
new and upcoming technologies. 
• Clear goals and success indicators to assess the outcomes of national 
and EU-wide information-sharing initiatives are needed, in order to 
enable progress tracking towards common, coordinated goals in CIP 
policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: A PARADIGM SHIFT? 
n recent decades, our lives have become increasingly dependent on a 
number of pieces of infrastructure, ranging from physical assets – such 
as roads or the electricity grid – to the networked environment –such as 
financial services, or the internet.1 We perform many activities and satisfy 
many of our primary needs thanks to these types of infrastructure: relying 
on critical infrastructure allows us to act more economically and efficiently. 
This also means, however, that the disruption of infrastructure may 
damage our economies substantially and lead to natural disasters and loss 
of human life. Suffice it to recall the recent failures of the electricity grids in 
November 2006 in Western Europe, when a shutdown of a high-voltage 
line in Germany resulted in massive power failures in France and Italy, as 
well as in parts of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, 
and even extended as far as Morocco, affecting ten million customers in 
total.2 Similar major blackouts, with even more severe consequences 
occurred in the summer of 2003 in the United States, Canada and in Italy, 
for various reasons.3 Recently, the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon oil 
platform in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010, resulted in the massive, 
ongoing leak of underground oil.4 Likewise, air travel disruptions caused 
                                                     
1 See, inter alia, Ivo Bouwmans, Margot P.C. Weijnen and Adrian Gheorghe, 
Infrastructures at Risk, in A.V. Gheorghe, M. Masera, M Weijnen and De L. Vries 
(2006), “Critical Infrastructures at Risk”, Springer Netherlands, (2006), pp. 19-36. 
2 Laprie et al. (2008), Modelling Interdependencies between the Electricity and 
Information Infrastructures: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0809/0809.4107.pdf 
3 Idem, quoting US-Canada, “Power System Outage Task Force — Final Report on 
the 14 August 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and 
Recommendations,” (2004). And P. Pourbeik, P. S. Kundur and C. W. Taylor, “The 
Anatomy of a Power Grid Blackout,” IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, 
September/October issue, pp. 22-29, (2006). 
4 See Los Angeles Times, Gulf Oil Spill: Katrina on Obama Administrations’ mind, 2 
May 2010, by Paul Harris, at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/ 
05/katrina-on-obama-administrations-mind-in-oil-spill-response.html.   
I
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by the eruption of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano cost nearly $5 billion in 
global GDP, according to a report from Oxford Economics.5 
Against this background, several governments around the world 
have concluded that infrastructures that are considered to be ‘critical’ are 
increasingly vulnerable and interdependent with other critical 
infrastructures. The relevance of some infrastructures for the continuity of 
government, for business operations and for the supply of basic services to 
citizens has become so high that a disruption of any of these fundamental 
assets can cause considerable damage. And the risk is significant. For 
example, the World Economic Forum estimated in 2008 that there is a 10-
20% probability of a major breakdown of the critical information 
infrastructure in the next ten years, with a potential global economic cost of 
approximately $250 billion.6 The macroeconomic costs of a major 
disruption to Switzerland, for example, with an annual GDP of CHF 482 
billion, are estimated to be CHF 6 billion, i.e. 1.2% of GDP.7 
Examples are manifold, and increasingly include threats from the 
internet world – as was seen in the now famous cyber-attack on Estonia in 
2007. To give an idea of the magnitude of current exposure to threats of 
cyber-attacks, a recent study estimated that the cost of 24 hours of 
downtime as a result of a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure averages at 
US$ 6 million per day, with the peak being reached in the oil and gas sector 
($8.4 million) and the lowest average amount in the water and sewage 
sector. The estimated cost of cyber-attacks was thought to be US$ 1.75 
billion yearly – but this estimate does not take into account the opportunity 
cost borne by businesses that experience denials of service. According to an 
OECD report on “Malicious software”, the estimated annual loss to US 
businesses caused by malware is USD 67.2 billion.8 Currently, no such 
                                                     
5 See the Oxford Economics report, The Economic Impact of Air Travel Restrictions due 
to Volcanic Ash, available online at http://www.bevoelkerungsschutz.admin.ch/ 
internet/bs/en/home/themen/ski/aktuell.parsys.87229.DownloadFile.tmp/econ
omicimpactsofvolcanoinisland2010.pdf. 
6 See Global Risks 2008. A Global Risk Network Report, available online at 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/globalrisk/report2008.pdf.  
7 The US Business Roundtable in 2007 suggested that the economic costs of a 
month-long internet disruption to the US alone could be more than $200 billion. 
8 See OECD, Malicious software (Malware): A Security Threat to the Internet Economy, 
Ministerial Background Report, DSTI/ICCP/REG(2007)5/FINAL, at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/34/40724457.pdf. The estimate however 
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estimates are available for the EU or for the majority of EU member states. 
This lack of data makes it more difficult to both frame the issues and 
provide a deeper analysis of the challenges faced by the EU. 
An important development highlighted by many governments and 
field experts is that critical infrastructures have become increasingly 
mutually dependent.9 This means than a denial of service in, say, the 
energy sector can have immediate repercussions for many other 
infrastructures, from the financial services networks to the internet, gas and 
transportation networks, generating a cascading effect that ultimately 
harms society exponentially. For example, the Canadian government 
reported that: 
… during the 1998 Ice Storm, large segments of rural and urban 
communities were in the dark and without heat. Traffic and street 
lights were out. Banking and government services were 
interrupted. The disruption in one sector – electricity – affected a 
score of others, interrupting the delivery of important services 
upon which Canadians depend.10 
 
                                                                                                                                       
comes from the US Government Accountability Office, United States Government 
Accountability Office (2007), Cybercrime: Public and Private Entities Face Challenges in 
Addressing Cyber Threats, available online at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d07705.pdf. 
9 More precisely, infrastructures can either be independent, dependent, or 
mutually dependent. An independent infrastructure is one that in principle is 
isolated from the risks associated with other infrastructures. A dependent 
infrastructure is one that relies on another infrastructure (but not vice versa). Last, 
mutually dependent infrastructures depend on each other, with a successful attack 
to either resulting in damage to both. The growing interdependence of 
infrastructures has been confirmed by many Task Force participants. As an 
example, in a survey completed in 2008 by Secure Computing, when asked about 
the interconnection of control networks and corporate networks, over 60% of the 
199 respondents said their networks were already interconnected and 98% said 
that interconnection increased their security risks. See Nicholson (2008), at 
http://www.securecomputing.com/pdf/IDCEnergyCybersecurity.pdf.  
10 Public Safety Canada, February 2008.  
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The issue of sector interdependence – and more generally, the issue of 
critical infrastructure protection – is being substantially affected by the 
information revolution. First, virtually all of critical infrastructure sectors 
are dependent on information technology. Second, information technology, 
and specifically the internet and the services available through it are firmly 
engrained in the way society and the economy functions.  Today, the need 
to protect the critical information infrastructure – which normally includes 
both the telecoms and internet backbones, although definitions vary 
depending on the country – has gradually blurred the boundaries between 
CIP and CIIP. As stated, inter alia by Luiijf et al. (2008) in his review of 
critical infrastructure in the Netherlands:  
The first paradigm shift is that most of the critical infrastructure 
(CI) is monitored and controlled by ICT-systems with their 
inherent vulnerabilities. Our security and safety, health, economy, 
and way of life are highly dependent on the interrelated trio 
electricity, communications, and computer systems ... The 
increasing complexity, (inter)-dependencies, and convergence of 
infrastructures increased the vulnerability of modern societies.11 
Recent events such as the Estonian Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks (DDoS) that swamped various web sites in Estonia in 2007 – 
including those of the parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and 
broadcasters – have drawn even further attention to the issue of cyber-
attacks and their potential relevance for critical infrastructures, such as 
financial services, power grids, telecoms, and government and business 
continuity.  
 
                                                     
11 See Luiijf et al., Critical (information) infrastructure protection in the Netherlands, at 
http://subs.emis.de/LNI/Proceedings/Proceedings36/GI-Proceedings.36-1.pdf. 
Box 1. Interdependence and resilience during 9/11 
Cukier et al. (2005) offer an interesting reading of what happened on 
September 11, 2001:1 
“After the second plane crashed into the South Tower at 9:02 am, telephone calls 
increased up to ten times the normal traffic volume – so much congestion that only a 
handful could get through. Major news Web sites – CNN, the BBC, The New York 
Times and others – were so clogged with traffic they became temporarily unreachable. 
By 9:39 am many radio stations in the city went dark (most broadcasters had 
transmitters on the towers). When the first tower collapsed at 10:05 am, and then the 
second at 10:28 am, they destroy d a vast amount of telecom inf structure in the 
vicinity, complicating communicatio s even more. 
To be sure, in many instances the systems proved resilient. For instance, 
network technicians struggling to repair systems coordinated their activities using 
mobile text messages since their cell phones couldn’t handle calls. And as many noted 
afterwards, the internet worked when the phone system didn’t. Indeed, at 9.54 pm the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency alerted all stations to prepare in case primary 
communications methods failed – and did this, ironically, by email. 
But here is the nub: as bad as all this sounds, the actual event did not do too 
much damage to the information infrastructure – yet subsequent problems with other 
networks began to cause havoc. For instance, a fire at a building on the periphery of the 
World Trade Center knocked out a power station upon which telecoms equipment 
elsewhere depended. A falling beam from an unstable building in the vicinity crashed 
into an operator’s central switching office, damaging the machines. By late evening, 
systems that had survived went down simply because they overheated. And telecom 
services were disrupted when backup generators ran out of fuel because trucks carrying 
new provisions were blocked from entering lower Manhattan. 
In short, the incident highlights both the vulnerability and resilience of 
information infrastructure – and importantly, its interdependence with other 
infrastructures. For instance, the communications network is dependent on the 
electrical grid; the back-up generators are dependent on the roadway network. And of 
course, it bears noting, that the target of the attack in New York was not 
communica ion  infrastructure at ll, bu  two office build ngs. What might have bee  
the consequences if critical information infrastructure had been targeted as well?” 
So
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very pressing problem, especially as calls for more pan-European 
infrastructures are mounting.13  
Figure 2. Example of propagation chain for the electricity network 
Source: Gustavsson (2010). 
Furthermore, the waves of privatisation and market liberalisation 
have made the protection of critical infrastructure more difficult to achieve 
by government alone, as most of the critical infrastructures (approximately 
85%) are owned by the private sector. Since private suppliers are growing 
in importance, especially in the ICT field, they must be kept in the picture 
when designing a policy for CIP. This also means that, without adequate 
collaboration between public and private sector representatives, no 
effective CIP policy can be put in place.  
As shown during Task Force meetings, critical infrastructures – once 
only local and fragmented – are increasingly global. In addition, they are 
becoming more concentrated. However, the policies in place to remedy the 
increased vulnerability of infrastructures are still eminently local. Because 
of this, regulators need to coordinate better at a global level. Actions, 
                                                     
13 See the Trans-European Networks (TENs) agenda, and also the recent Monti 
Report on the future of the Single Market, pp. 64-66, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf. 
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Figure 4. Interdependencies 
 
Source: Luiijf et al. (2008). 
In more detail, the challenge of protecting critical infrastructure has 
the following features:14 
• Private and public. The actors are many, and most infrastructures are 
private. The state can no longer ensure security and must rely on 
information-sharing with other actors involved. A well-conceived 
public-private partnership is thus needed and crucial to the success of 
any CIP policy.  
• Unbounded. Specifically in the case of Critical Information 
Infrastructures (CIIs), there are no physical barriers or political 
boundaries. Identifying who is responsible for what in terms of security 
policies and attributing malicious activity is a challenging task.  
                                                     
14 Presentation by Roberto Filippini (European Commission Joint Research Centre), 
at the second meeting of the CEPS Task Force, CEPS, Brussels.   
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• Networked. Critical infrastructures are an increasingly large-scale, 
open network, time-dependent and dynamically evolving environment. 
The size and number of interconnections may increase in response to 
the demands of various actors. 
• Complex. Critical infrastructures are complex: simplifications necessary 
to master the security problem and operate the systems may neglect 
states that can manifest suddenly (by surprise) with unpredictable 
consequences. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that simply 
decomposing the problem by divide et impera strategies does not work. 
Issues that create or increase complexity include the fact that large 
networks are inherently unstable;15 the fact that local disruptions may 
have an impact on many countries; the fact that global legal 
frameworks and institutions are lacking; and the huge administrative 
burden faced by global players with multinational presence when 
responding to fragmented national CIP policies.  
• Human. Critical infrastructures depend on human decisions and 
sufficiently knowledgeable and educated experts. In this respect, 
knowledge of ordinary tasks may become inadequate to face 
emergencies.  
• Vulnerable. Vulnerabilities are in all infrastructures and may expose 
sensitive information that can be exploited by attackers. Attackers that 
have been targeting CI for a long period (military) are increasingly 
using the cyber space.  
Figure 4 below – from Hellström (2007) – provides a view of the 
vulnerability problem and existing trends in CIP in terms of the root causes 
of potential adverse events of critical infrastructure; dynamic pressure 
exerted by changing patterns of production or consumption, and 
increasingly unsafe conditions in the cyber-world. The analysis applies, as a 
matter of fact, to all infrastructures – and only a fortiori to critical ones. 
When all sectors become regionally or globally interconnected, a first 
challenge is to sort out the critical infrastructures from the other types of 
infrastructure. 
                                                     
15 See Gardner & Ashby (1970), Connectance of Large Dynamic (Cybernetic) Systems: 
Critical Values for Stability, Nature 228, 784 (21 November 1970); 
doi:10.1038/228784a0. And May, R. M. (1972). Will a large Complex System be Stable?, 
Nature 238, 413-414. 1974. Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
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Figure 5. The progression of infrastructure vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hellström (2007). 
Finally, there is a growing cross-border dimension in critical 
infrastructure protection, which becomes even more visible in the case of 
information infrastructure. Figure 5 below shows a typical case of cross-
border negative externalities, which couples the increased interdependency 
between infrastructures with the increased interdependency between 
countries.16 The current development of CIP policies has led to 
advancements in the understanding of “type 1” problems, i.e. the causes of 
failure of a given infrastructure due to a fault in a single component. 
However, the dynamics with which the failure propagates to other critical 
infrastructures (“type 2”), the impact of faults in ICT on critical 
infrastructures (“type 3”) and the inter-state propagation of failures (“type 
4”) are little known today. 
                                                     
16 Presentation by Roberto Filippini (JRC, European Commission) at the 2nd 
meeting of the CEPS Task Force, CEPS, Brussels.  
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Figure 6. Cross-border interdependencies 
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Source: Filippini (2010). 
This report explains how the goal of protecting critical infrastructure 
– including critical information infrastructure – can be reconciled with the 
current architecture of EU policy-making, and be made more pervasive in 
the daily operations of EU institutions. In addition, we explore how 
increasingly global threats can effectively be dealt with through essentially 
local (but coordinated) measures. Section 2 below introduces CIP policy in 
more detail and discusses the national and EU initiatives in this field in 
more detail. Section 3 introduces the economics of CIP and explores the 
pending issues in developing a consistent and efficient CIP policy in 
Europe, ranging from the need to ensure cooperation between member 
states and national emergency response teams, to the need to shape an 
effective public-private partnership, and also to the need to develop an 
ontology and metric structure for risk assessment and management. Section 
4 illustrates the results of the CEPS Task Force in terms of how to address 
the main policy challenges in this field. We then summarize all the policy 
recommendations from the CEPS Task Force in a concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1: MAIN FINDINGS  
• Businesses, government and society are increasingly dependent on 
infrastructure, some of which are critical for the functioning of our 
economy: their disruption may cause major social disturbance and even 
lead to substantial loss of life or life-years.  
• Critical infrastructures are increasingly dependent on each other and 
partly interdependent, and the information infrastructure is 
increasingly interlinked with nearly all other infrastructures, including 
both critical and non-critical infrastructure. Accordingly, isolating 
critical from non-critical infrastructure is a challenge.  
• Our understanding of the causes of failure or attack to infrastructure is 
still limited, in particular when it comes to infrastructure 
(inter)dependency. 
• Countries are becoming increasingly dependent on CIs, and the 
understanding of cross-country (inter-)dependencies must be 
improved.  
• EU member states have fragmented and often uncoordinated CIP 
policies: there is no way to ‘call the EU’ in case of emergency. To 
achieve the power and efficiency of coordination, CIP policies should 
be strengthened in years to come and look at ways to deal with the 
fragmentation of most infrastructures, as well as at the fragmentation of 
current national policies.  
• A meaningful CIP policy is not possible without involving the private 
sector, as CIs are mostly owned by private players. 
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2. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION: BASIC FACTS AND 
EXISTING POLICIES 
efining critical infrastructures and distinguishing them from other 
infrastructures is a key challenge for policy-makers, and one that 
has been addressed in different ways by national governments. The 
challenge is made even greater by the fact that the concept of critical 
infrastructure is an evolving and dynamic one – think about the growing 
importance of the internet, which may warrant an inclusion of (parts of) 
this infrastructure in the list of CIIs. Section 2.1 below discusses the extent 
to which existing definitions diverge at national level, while Section 2.2 
highlights the ‘moving frontier’ between CIP and the protection of critical 
information infrastructure. Section 2.3 describes the role of the key players 
that operate in the CIP context, whereas Section 2.4 contains an illustration 
of the life cycle of CIP and the related policy actions. Finally, Section 2.5 
provides an overview of the recent EU policy actions in this domain.  
2.1 Defining and scoping critical infrastructures 
Several definitions of critical infrastructure exist in the literature and in 
official policy documents. The European Commission defines critical 
infrastructures as:  
[A]n asset, system or part thereof located in member states that 
is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, 
health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, 
and the disruption or destruction of which would have a 
significant impact on a member state as a result of the failure to 
maintain those functions.17 
The OECD has recently given two definitions of the term “critical” 
and “infrastructure”, which attempt to reconcile the various definitions 
given in the OECD member states. According to this definition:18 
                                                     
17 European Council Directive 2008/114/CE. 
18 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/41/40700392.pdf 
D
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• The term “critical” refers to infrastructure that provides an essential 
support for economic and social well-being, for public safety and for 
the functioning of key government responsibilities, such that 
disruption or destruction of the infrastructure would result in 
catastrophic and far-reaching damage. 
• National definitions of “infrastructure” refer to physical 
infrastructure and often also intangible assets and/or to production 
or communications networks. These definitions are very broad, 
certainly broader than the notion of infrastructure commonly used in 
other fields of policy (e.g. the “essential facility” notion in 
competition law) and end up including not only the tangible assets, 
but also the intangibles that run with them (e.g. software, services, 
etc.).  
Against this background, the definition of critical infrastructures is 
still a moving target. Table 1 below shows the definitions adopted in a 
number of countries, revealing important differences in the way the issue is 
addressed at the policy level.  
Table 1. Definitions of critical infrastructure in selected countries 
 
Source: OECD (2008). 
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Table 2 below shows the different sectors that are covered by national 
CIP plans. Here too, several commonalities can be identified, together with 
some minor differences in scope as regards safety, government, chemicals, 
the industrial defence base and other sectors.  
Table 2. Sectoral coverage of national CIP plans 
 
Source: OECD (2008). 
2.2 CIP and CIIP: A moving frontier 
One interesting aspect of the current debate on critical infrastructure 
protection is whether and to what extent critical information infrastructure 
(CII) should be considered as a specific province within the generic 
umbrella term CI. As explained by Brunner and Suter (2008),  
[M]ore than ten years after the beginning of the CIP debate, 
there still is little clarity with regard to a clear and stringent 
distinction between the two key terms ‘CIP’ and ‘CIIP’. In 
official publications, the term CIP is frequently used even if the 
document is only referring to the information aspects of the 
issue.19 
                                                     
19 Brunner, E. and M. Suter, International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009, available online 
at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=91952& 
lng=en. 
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Overall, it is widely acknowledged that CIIP can be seen as a subset of CIP, 
albeit essential for the purposes of infrastructure protection. 
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) generally refers to 
Information and Communication Technology systems that are essential to 
operations of national and international Critical Infrastructures. Examples 
include i) telecommunication networks, management, location-based 
services for emergency calls; ii) transportation: air traffic control, train 
routing and control, traffic management; iii) financial services: credit card 
transactions, settlement systems, transaction records, electronic stock/bond 
trading; and iv) control systems/SCADA (Supervisory, Control and Data 
Acquisition) to manage energy production and distribution, chemical 
manufacturing and refining processes. In a recent OECD recommendation, 
CII was defined as referring to:  
those interconnected information systems and networks, the 
disruption or destruction of which would have a serious impact 
on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of 
citizens, or on the effective functioning of government or the 
economy. 
CIIs can include i) information components supporting critical 
infrastructures; ii) information infrastructures supporting essential 
components of government business; and/or iii) information 
infrastructures essential to the national economy. Another widely accepted 
definition of CII is:  
communications or information service[s] whose availability, 
reliability and resilience are essential to the functioning of a 
modern [national] economy, security, and other essential social 
values.20 
As recently observed:  
all critical infrastructures (transportation, finance, electric 
power, water, etc.) are increasingly dependent on the evolving 
information infrastructure – the public telephone network, the 
internet, and terrestrial and satellite wireless networks – for a 
                                                     
20 See Cukier, K., Ensuring (and Insuring?) Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection: A Report of the 2005 Rueschlikon Conference on Information Policy”, at 
http://www.rueschlikonconference.org/pressdocs/56_R_05_Report_Online.pdf 
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variety of information management, communications, and 
control functions.21 
The meetings of the CEPS Task Force confirmed that many of the key 
concerns expressed by industry representatives in specific sectors of the 
economy (including finance and energy) are intimately related to the 
growing importance of the information infrastructure entangled with the 
traditional physical infrastructure. For example, theft of financial data and 
disruption of electrical and/or smart grids through cyber attacks are 
among the key concerns of stakeholders from the respective sectors.  
The fact that boundaries between CIP and CIIP are increasingly 
blurred is also testified by recent accidents. For example, in March 2007 an 
experiment (the Aurora Generator Test) conducted by the Idaho National 
Labs in the US demonstrated that a large diesel generator could be severely 
damaged by exploiting a computer vulnerability, revealing that physical 
damage could be done through the computer system. As reported also by 
PwC (2010), “the results of this test elevated the cyber attack threat to a 
new level. Prior to conducting the test, utility companies had focused 
primarily on protecting their physical assets from more conventional 
attacks”.22 The same applies to recent news that in April and June 2009 
Russian and Chinese spies had penetrated the US electrical grid and that 
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) was teaming 
with a defence contractor to create an initiative to evaluate power 
companies’ ability to withstand cyber attacks.23 The NERC eventually 
accepted 83 standards for security of the electrical grid, condensed them 
into eight CIP standards and empowered the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to oversee their implementation.24 However, there has 
                                                     
21 See the National Academic Press article at: 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10685 
22 See Price Waterhouse Coopers, Cyber Attacks: is your Critical Infrastructure Safe?, 
at: http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/utilities/assets/cyber-attacks.pdf.  
23 Idem. NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, a self-
regulatory organisation, subject to oversight by the US Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission and governmental authorities in Canada, whose mission is to ensure 
the reliability of the bulk power system in North America.  
24 See, inter alia, The Project Grey Goose Report on Critical Infrastructure, February 
2010, at http://dataclonelabs.com/security_talkworkshop/papers/25550091-Proj-
Grey-Goose-report-on-Critical-Infrastructure-Attacks-Actors-and-Emerging-
Threats.pdf. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the US federal 
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been criticism that the standards identified do not go far enough, and a 
more comprehensive approach to risk and security in this domain would 
be needed.25 
Furthermore, the transition towards smart electric grids highlights 
the increasing interdependencies between physical and electronic 
infrastructures. As described, by Anderson and Fuloria (2010), among 
others:  
the EU is strongly encouraging its 27 member states to replace 
utility meters with ‘smart meters’ by 2022 … Yet it is not at all clear 
what it means for a meter to be secure … there are at least half-a-
dozen different stakeholders with different views on security – 
which can refer to information, to money, or to the supply of 
electricity.26 
A similar rationale can be applied to cloud computing, to name one 
emerging sector.27 
A more controversial issue is whether the internet should be 
considered as a CII. In this respect, the CEPS Task Force observed that 
although society’s reliance on internet services, including e-commerce, 
telecommuting, communication, remote control and diagnostics is growing 
and a major internet outage can have a significant economic impact, the 
internet is not considered a CII.28 However, many CIIs, especially control 
and communication systems are increasingly connected to the internet and 
rely on public online services, which can make them vulnerable to cyber 
attacks. Furthermore, with an increasing number of high-value services 
available through the internet and the accelerating shift towards perimeter-
                                                                                                                                       
agency with jurisdiction over interstate electricity sales, wholesale electric rates, 
hydroelectric licensing, natural gas pricing, and oil pipeline rates. FERC also 
reviews and authorises liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, interstate natural 
gas pipelines and non-federal hydropower projects. 
25 See the Critical Infrastructure blog of 16 July 2009: 
http://criticalinfrastructure.blogspot.com/2009/07/cip-standards-may-not-be-
enough-to.html 
26 Anderson, R. and S. Fuloria, (2010) On the Security Economics of Electricity 
Metering, Harvard University, WEIS'10. 
27 For example, see Molnar and Schechter, Self Hosting vs. Cloud Hosting: Accounting 
for the security impact of hosting in the cloud, WEIS’10.  
28 Presentation by Matt Broda at the CEPS Task Force, Brussels.   
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less enterprise computing models the internet and online services are 
becoming increasingly critical to social stability and the economy (e.g. 
email, instant messaging, weather reports and warnings, e-commerce and 
online banking, outsourced IT support and services, e-government services, 
e-health, cloud computing). The reliance continues to increase and 
infrastructure evolves to adapt to the changing needs of society. This also 
leads to an increased interplay between the domain of cyber security and 
that of CIIP policy (see Figure 7 below). 
A key role in CIIP is played by centralised control systems and 
SCADA systems, which are widely employed to monitor and control 
infrastructures remotely. However, SCADA-based systems are not always 
considered to be secure, as recalled by Brunner and Suter (2008):  
once-cloistered systems and networks are increasingly using 
off-the-shelf products and IP-based networking equipment, and 
require interconnection via the internet, which opens the door to 
attackers from the outside in addition to those on the inside.29 
                                                     
29 Brunner and Suter, op. cit., at p. 38. 
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Figure 7. Cyber-security and CIIP 
 
Source: Broda (2010). 
The CEPS Task Force strongly recommends that a coordinated, 
holistic approach be adopted, encompassing both CIP and CIIP. An early 
recognition of the need for a coordinated approach between these two 
policy domains came in 2003 from the “G8 Principles for Protecting Critical 
Information Infrastructures” adopted by the G8 Justice & Interior 
Ministers, which clearly state that:  
In order effectively to protect critical infrastructures … countries 
must protect critical information infrastructures from damage and 
secure them against attack … Effective protection also requires 
communication, coordination, and cooperation nationally and 
internationally among all stakeholders – industry, academia, the 
 
From ITU-D/1/146  
Rev.2-E draft 
PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EU | 29 
private sector, and government entities, including infrastructure 
protection and law enforcement agencies.30 
2.3 C(I)IP: Key players 
Over the years, and in particular during the past decade, the CIP universe 
has been populated with increasingly diverse and specialised entities, 
which play a key role as “the infrastructure of critical infrastructure 
protection”. In this section, we briefly introduce the non-expert reader to 
these often-unknown bodies.31 
? Government 
Responsibility for the coordination of CIP and CIIP policy rests with 
government in the very first instance. At national level, departmental 
ministers in charge of homeland security are mainly responsible for 
coordinating the policy.  
? Specialised response teams 
Every country that has a CIIP policy relies on some form of response team. 
Depending on the country, the name can be replaced by synonymous terms 
such as – CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination 
Centre); CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team); IRT (Incident 
Response Team); CIRT (Computer Incident Response Team); SERT 
(Security Emergency Response Team). Initially a mere reaction force, 
CERTs have extended their capacities to become a complete security 
service provider, including prevention services such as alerts, security 
advisories, training and security management services. The term “CERT” is 
a protected label of Carnegie Mellon CERT, the first CERT of the world. As 
a result, the new term “CSIRT” was established at the end of the 1990s. At 
the moment both terms (CERT and CSIRT) are used synonymously, with 
CSIRT being the more precise term. Figure 8, below shows the main 
services offered by CERTs with National Responsibility in Europe.  
                                                     
30 http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/g82004/G8_CIIP_Principles.pdf 
31 These players do not fill every possible gap in the CIP cycle. Depending on the 
country, dedicated institutions such as sectoral regulators (e.g. in energy, 
telecommunications, finance) and political institutions (e.g. the US Senate) 
contribute to policy actions aimed at strengthening CIP policy. 
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Figure 8. Services offered by CERTs with National Responsibility 
 
Source: ENISA. 
? Analysis, communication and reporting centres 
A key role in the CIP landscape is played by dedicated centres that deal 
with a number of steps in the CIP cycle, including warning and alerts, 
information-sharing, reporting and often also awareness-raising and 
education. For example, Warning, Advice and Reporting Points (WARPs) 
have been established in the UK as part of the information-sharing strategy 
of NISCC (the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre) to 
protect the UK Critical National Infrastructure from electronic attack. 
WARPs have been shown to be effective in improving information security 
by stimulating better communication of alerts and warnings, improving 
awareness and education, and encouraging incident reporting. WARP 
members agree to work together in a community and share information to 
reduce the risk of their information systems being compromised and 
therefore reduce the risks to their organisation. This sharing community 
could be based on a business sector, geographic location, technology 
standards, risk grouping or whatever makes business sense.32 
                                                     
32 In more detail, WARPs: i) receive warnings/advice from 
WARPs/CSIRTs/CERTs and other sources, filter and assess them, and reissue 
them to their community where appropriate (perhaps with increased priority or 
added value); ii) provide email and/or telephone advice to community members 
on security matters; iii) solicit and record IT-security incident reports from the 
community; iv) share (possibly sanitised) incident reporting data with other 
WARPs/CERTs etc., with whom a sharing agreement has been reached (formal or 
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In the US experience on critical infrastructure protection, the role of 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) is considered essential, 
since these bodies represent private CI owners in various sectors of the 
economy. ISACs began with the National Coordinating Center for 
Communications (NCC) back in 1984 and the Financial Services ISAC in 
1999.33 Today, there are 14 ISACs in place, and they also jointly formed an 
ISAC Council.  
An ISAC is defined as a trusted, sector-specific entity, which  
o Provides to its constituency a 24/7 Secure Operating Capability that 
establishes the sector’s specific information/intelligence requirements 
for incidents, threats and vulnerabilities.  
o Collects, analyses, and disseminates alerts and incident reports to its 
membership based on its sector focused subject matter analytical 
expertise; 
o Helps the government understand impacts for its sector; 
o Provides an electronic, trusted capability for its membership to 
exchange and share information on cyber, physical and all threats in 
order to defend the critical infrastructure; and 
o Shares and provides analytical support to government and other 
ISACs regarding technical sector details and in mutual information-
sharing and assistance during actual or potential sector disruptions 
whether caused by intentional, accidental or natural events. 
? Private sector 
Given that most of the critical infrastructure is operated on a commercial 
basis, it goes without saying that no concrete and effective policy can be 
implemented without strong public-private collaboration. Brunner and 
Suter (2008) report that:  
all countries examined have recognized the importance of public-
private partnerships (PPP) … Different types of such partnerships 
                                                                                                                                       
informal);32 v) contribute incident data, resources and/or expertise/knowledge to 
peers etc to help deal with widespread problems; vi) participate in ‘networking’ 
and sharing of experiences and knowledge with other members of the information-
sharing network; vii) develop close links with selected WARPs/CSIRTs/CERTs for 
support and collaboration on problems. 
33 See ISAC Council (2004), at http://www.isaccouncil.org/whitepapers/files/ 
Information_Sharing_and_Analysis_013104.pdf 
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are emerging, including government-led partnerships, business-
led partnerships, and joint public-private initiatives. In 
Switzerland, Korea, the UK, and the US, strong links have already 
been established between the private business community and 
various government organisations. One of the future challenges in 
many countries will be to achieve a balance between security 
requirements and business efficiency imperatives. Satisfying 
shareholders by maximizing company profits has often led to 
minimal security measures. This is because like many political 
leaders, business leaders tend to view cyber-attacks on 
infrastructures as a tolerable risk.34 
It must be recalled, however, that the private sector is itself very 
heterogeneous. In particular, several infrastructure owners and operators 
are local by their very nature, and do not necessarily exhibit a large scale. 
At the same time, CI suppliers – in particular those belonging to the IT 
sector – have much more limited local capabilities, and are more global in 
scale. This makes public-private cooperation potentially more difficult, but 
also more fruitful. At the same time, it needs to be noted that the private 
sector already works together via associations/organisations such as 
ICASI35 (Industry Consortium for the Advancement of Security on the 
internet) and FIRST.36 A good example is the Conficker Work Group, where 
industry representatives came together on a common issue. These pro-
active self-forming industry efforts should be connected to the PPPs. 
2.4 The Critical Infrastructure Protection life cycle 
CIP policy is not limited to securing an immediate and effective response in 
case of disruption. On the contrary, there are widely recognized phases in 
the CIP cycle that combine prevention and cure. More specifically, 
governments and private parties involved should make sure that effective 
policy measures are in place for prevention and early warning, detection of 
major threats, risks and vulnerabilities. When a major failure occurs, 
measures should be in place to ensure a timely reaction and efficient crisis 
management.  
                                                     
34 Idem., p. 535. 
35 See their website at: www.icasi.org 
36 See their website at: www.first.org  
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More specifically, the US experience has led to the identification of six 
main phases of the critical infrastructure protection event cycle, occurring 
before, during, and after an event that may compromise or degrade the 
infrastructure. These six phases build on one another to create a framework 
for a comprehensive solution for infrastructure assurance. They are 
structured as follows: 
Phase 1. Analysis and assessment. The analysis and assessment phase is 
the foundation and most important phase of the CIP life cycle. 
This phase identifies the assets or functions that are absolutely 
critical to mission success and determines the assets’ or the 
functions’ vulnerabilities, as well as their interdependencies, 
configurations, and characteristics. An assessment is then made 
of the operational impact of infrastructure loss or degradation. 
For example, Proactive Cyber Defence may anticipate an attack 
against computers and networks. It applies equally well to all 
critical infrastructure sectors, as it involves intercepting and 
disrupting an attack or a threat, either pre-emptively or in self-
defence.  
Phase 2. Remediation. The remediation phase involves precautionary 
measures and actions taken before an event occurs to fix the 
known cyber and physical vulnerabilities that could cause an 
outage or compromise a CI, critical asset or function. For 
example, remediation actions may include education and 
awareness, operational process or procedural changes or 
system configuration and component changes.  
Phase 3. Indications and warnings (before and/or during an event). The 
indications and warnings phase involves monitoring to assess 
the mission assurance capabilities of critical infrastructure 
assets and to determine if there are event indications to report. 
Indications are preparatory actions that indicate whether an 
infrastructure event is likely to occur or is planned. Indications 
are based on input at the tactical, operational, theatre, and 
strategic level. At the tactical level, input comes from asset 
owners. At the operational level, input comes from the CI 
sectors. At the theatre level input comes from regional assets 
such as allied intelligence, NATO, command intelligence, allied 
governments, and coalition forces. At the strategic level, input 
comes from intelligence, law enforcement, and the private 
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a. its goal is almost uniquely operational in that it deals with actual facts 
when they occur,  
b. in dealing with real life situations it takes into account a multiplicity  
of events,  thus 
c. focusing on issues that are relevant for practical proceedings. 
The concept originated from debates on the structuring of a “Business 
Continuity Glossary” of the IT Expert Group of the Tripartite Forum, where 
a chapter was dedicated to “Crisis management”. Early versions of this 
chapter dealt with issues like “phasing and acting” on one side and 
“landmarks” on another. Notions like “early warning signal”, “emergency 
situation”, “alerts”, “triggers”, “escalation procedure” were scattered 
unevenly. Some of them were common to several phases, others were 
specific. There was a need for more consistency and clearer articulation.  
Figure 10 below is a simplified version of the current model. This 
model was successfully applied to actual financial crises. Its scope could 
easily be extended. Apart from its overall practicality, such a model draws 
attention to several factors, such as: 
- the importance of (often weak) warning signals; and 
- the dynamics of events ‘inside’ a crisis; which analysis should 
provide a less disputable answer to the question “is the crisis over ?” 
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Figure 10. The crisis life-cycle (simplified) 
 
Source: Gresser , Parsifal project (see footnote 74). 
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Key parameters in infrastructure vulnerability assessment are the 
following: 
• Discoverability: How easy is it to find the vulnerability? 
• Reproducibility: How easy is it to reproduce the attack? 
• Exploitability: Measures how complex the process is to exploit the 
vulnerability (unproven, proof of concept, functional, and highly 
likely). 
• Access vector: Measures whether a specific vulnerability is exploitable 
locally or remotely. 
• Access complexity: Measures the complexity of attack required to 
exploit the vulnerability once an attacker has access to the target 
system. 
• Authentication: Measures whether or not an attacker needs to be 
authenticated to the target system in order to exploit the 
vulnerability. 
• Remediation level: Measures the level of solution available (official fix, 
temporary fix, workaround, unavailable). 
• Report confidence: Measures the degree of confidence in the existence 
of the vulnerability and the credibility of its report (unconfirmed, 
uncorroborated, and confirmed). 
In the case of CII, additional parameters can be added in the 
vulnerability assessment, such as: 
• C‐I‐A (confidentiality, integrity and availability) impact of the 
vulnerability; 
• Sensitivity to latency; 
• Regulatory restrictions that have an impact on technical support; 
• Embedded security services; 
• Unknown vulnerabilities for specific devices; 
• Complexity level of the IT asset. 
 
Moreover, another important parameter is the independence, 
dependence, or mutual dependence of the infrastructure at hand. This also 
affects the likelihood and type of cascading and escalating effects. In a 
cascading failure, a disruption in one infrastructure causes a disruption in a 
second infrastructure; in an escalating failure, a disruption in one 
infrastructure exacerbates an independent disruption of a second 
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infrastructure (e.g., the time for recovery or restoration of an infrastructure 
increases because another infrastructure is not available); finally, in a so-
called “common cause” failure, a disruption of two or more infrastructures at 
the same time occurs because of a common cause (e.g., natural disaster, 
right-of-way corridor). 
The present description does not aim to be exhaustive. Rather, it is 
meant to highlight the growing complexity of vulnerability assessment in 
the prevention phase of the CIP life cycle. In this respect, a frequently 
stressed need is that of adopting an ‘all-hazards’ approach to CIP policy. 
This requires that all potential sources of risk (natural, man-made) as well 
as their likely interdependencies and domino effects are taken into account 
when defining a strategy to enhance preparedness towards given threats.  
2.5 Existing CIP policies 
2.5.1 Trends in national policies for CIP and CIIP 
As reported during meetings of the CEPS Task Force, member states are 
currently grappling with several challenges in respect of CIP policy: i) the 
world economic situation has led to an underinvestment in CIP; ii) there 
are missing business cases, meaning that there are a limited number of 
examples where threats have been realised, and this had led some 
stakeholders to wonder if the investment is justified; iii) there are questions 
regarding the problems to be addressed in practice-attacks, coordination, 
global or regional levels, etc.; iv) there needs to be a prioritization among 
sectors on the basis of clear criteria, which means that some sectors will not 
be a priority focus; v) there is a lack of understanding of the amount of 
investment needed to offset the risk; (vi) the long-term impact of CIP 
protection, as well as the prevalence of threats to society are still to be fully 
understood. 
More generally, although the challenges are global, accountability 
still mostly rests with national governments. In addition, there are 
important cultural and legal specificities that inform responses and are 
different across countries. This makes establishing a harmonised global 
approach towards C(I)IP more complex.  
For example, while the UK employed a multi-agency approach with 
coordination between the public and private sector, France’s strategy seems 
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to be more focused on the role of the public sector;38 and the strategy used 
by the Netherlands relies on a form of public-private coordination, but with 
significant input from the private sector.   
In 2008, a report by the Swiss Crisis and Risk Network (CRN) looked 
at CIP policy developments in 25 countries and noted the emergence of 
three main trends. 
? First, many countries pay increasing attention to the concepts of resilience 
and all-hazard approaches. The reason for the increased focus on 
resilience is mostly related to the fact that comprehensive protection 
of all critical infrastructures – once they have been identified – against 
all threats and risks is impossible, not only for technical and practical 
reasons, but also because of cost. Priorities must thus be established 
by distinguishing between critical infrastructures that deserve a 
greater level of attention, or by identifying vital points within a 
critical infrastructure. But this calls for the availability of data. 
Without reliable data, the only way to organise a meaningful CIP 
policy is to strengthen the understanding of the causes and effects of 
infrastructure failures, including natural accidents and man-made 
attacks. This leads to the conclusion that it is beneficial to adopt an 
‘all-hazards’ approach, designed for comprehensive protection 
irrespective of the nature of the threat, with a focus on the capability 
to respond to a whole spectrum of unanticipated events. Recent 
examples that go in this direction include the Canadian Public Safety 
department’s document on “Working Towards a National Strategy 
and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure”; and the approach 
adopted by the new Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (SCCA) 
created in January 2009. 
? Second, this has direct implications for how CIP is organised: a move 
towards the centralisation of responsibility in this policy domain can be 
observed. This is mostly driven by the increasingly holistic nature of 
the threats and the risks to which society is exposed, as well as by the 
trend (described above) towards an all-hazards approach to CIP 
policy. Recent examples can be observed in Canada, Sweden and the 
UK.  
? Third, there is continued or even growing attention to the cyber-
dimension of the issue, linked to the growing awareness that globally 
                                                     
38 N. Robinson, presentation at the CEPS Task Force, meeting 4, CEPS, Brussels.  
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connected information and communication technologies have 
become a particularly vulnerable part of every country’s national 
infrastructure (often also discussed in terms of ‘cyber war’). 
Initiatives by the US and France, but also by NATO, are guided by 
the concern that the information and communication infrastructures 
are increasingly vulnerable not only because of their extremely dense 
connectivity, but also due to both the state’s and society’s 
dependence on them.  
2.5.2 EU-level policy initiatives 
At the EU level, the European Commission has defined as European 
Critical Infrastructures (ECIs):  
those designated critical infrastructures which are of the highest 
importance for the Community and which if disrupted or 
destroyed would affect two or more MS, or a single member state 
if the critical infrastructure is located in another member state.39 
 Following the bomb attacks by al Qaeda in Madrid, the June 2004 Council 
asked for the preparation of an overall strategy to protect critical 
infrastructure. On 20 October 2004, the Commission adopted a 
Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against 
Terrorism, which put forward suggestions for what would enhance 
European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks 
involving Critical Infrastructures (CI). 
The Council conclusions on “Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
to Terrorist Attacks” and the “EU Solidarity Programme on the 
Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks” adopted by Council in 
December 2004 endorsed the intention of the Commission to propose a 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and 
agreed to the setting up by the Commission of a Critical Infrastructure 
Warning Information Network (CIWIN). Following this call, several 
initiatives have been launched at the EU level to contribute to a more 
integrated CIP policy. These include the European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP); the European Public Private Partnership 
for Resilience; the European Forum of Member States; the appointment and 
proactive role of ENISA and the EISAS feasibility study. 
                                                     
39 See European Commission Communication on a European Programme for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM(2006) 786 final, 12 December 2006. 
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2.5.2.1 The EPCIP 
Back in November 2005, the Commission adopted a Green Paper on a 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which 
provided policy options on how the Commission could establish EPCIP 
and CIWIN. The December 2005 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council 
Conclusions on Critical Infrastructure Protection called upon the 
Commission to make a proposal for a European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. A 2006 Communication set out the principles, 
processes and instruments proposed to implement EPCIP. The 
implementation of EPCIP will be supplemented where relevant by sector-
specific Communications setting out the Commission’s approach to 
particular critical infrastructure sectors. Critical information infrastructures 
(CIIs) are tougher to identify. The ECI directive simply writes that ICT will 
be the next sector to which the EC will look to define criteria for the 
criticality of ICT CIs. Thus, there is no formal definition at the moment, but 
this is a priority for the Commission. 
The second pillar of the CIIP initiative is the 2006 Communication on 
Secure Information Society. It is part of the i2010 Strategy, which in turn 
was part of the Lisbon Strategy. The initiative must be framed by what the 
Commission is trying to do in information security activities. One of the 
core principles is the idea that security and resilience must in some way 
boost trust.  Security is not a value in itself. It must serve a purpose to drive 
forward the information society. 
As the action plan is based on a Communication, it is not based on a 
regulatory instrument in a conventional binding sense. The member states 
are not bound by any obligations. There are three main reasons for this:  
• First, the Commission does not have the legal basis to enact binding 
law of the nature contained in the Communication.   
• Second, the whole goal of the initiative is to make stakeholders talk to 
each other and to TRUST each other. Trust is not easily engendered 
through binding regulation.   
• Third, developing a legal basis would have taken too much time, as it 
must go though the European Council etc. There was/is a need for 
action now.    
2.5.2.2 The EP3R: Its objectives and its tools 
An example of an activity is the European Public-Private Partnership for 
Resilience (EP3R). This is still in its preparation stage, and accordingly the 
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exact scope and goals of this initiative still need to be determined. Overall, 
the goal of the EP3R is to improve information-sharing between the public 
and private sectors. Below, in Section 4 of this report, we provide some 
suggestions as to how this can be done in a fruitful way.  
2.5.2.3 The European Forum for Member States 
The European Forum for Member States allows the Commission and 
member states to discuss freely and privately the important issues and 
share practice, such as prevention and reaction capabilities. Also, the 
European Security Response Group aims to get the national CSIRTs talking 
to one another. Presently, few CSIRTs are sharing information. This is 
important because some CSIRTs are not performing at a high level and 
could benefit from a knowledge transfer from other CSIRTs. 
Figure 12. CSIRT activity in Europe 
 
Source: ENISA, EISAS Final Report (2010). 
Another initiative of the Commission is to increase international 
cooperation at the global level. The goal here is to identify principles and 
guidelines (specifically for internet protection, but to be expanded to other 
areas of ICT) at EU and global level. The US, Canada, and Japan are the 
44 | CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: BASIC FACTS AND EXISTING POLICIES 
main actors in this area. One of the key obstacles to be overcome is of a 
very preliminary nature: some member states do not even consider the 
internet to be a critical information infrastructure, and this obviously 
hampers international dialogue. The goal is then to take this EU agreement 
and coordinate it at the global level. The Commission approach takes into 
account the fact that the internet is very diffuse. A top-down approach is 
therefore not really possible; a more mixed approach (top-down and 
bottom-up) is needed.     
2.5.2.4 CIIP policies and the role of ENISA 
ENISA is an EU body established in 2004 to carry out very specific 
technical, scientific tasks in the field of Network and Information Security.40 
This work is only performed within the ‘Community domain’ (‘first pillar’ 
and internal market of the EU): as a “European Community Agency”. 
ENISA’s mission is essential to achieve a high and effective level of 
Network and Information Security within the European Union. Together 
with the EU-institutions and the member states, ENISA seeks to develop a 
culture of network and information security for the benefit of citizens, 
consumers, businesses and public sector organisations in the European 
Union. ENISA helps the European Commission, the member states and the 
business community to address, respond and especially to prevent network 
and information security problems. The agency also assists the European 
Commission in the technical preparatory work for updating and 
developing Community legislation in the field of network and information 
security. 
ENISA’s mandate was extended to 2012 during the lengthy and 
difficult negotiations that led to the revision of the telecoms package in 
Europe. Member states are now starting to agree that ENISA’s scope 
should be extended. To help co-ordinate Europe’s response, the European 
Commission has proposed a new regulation to strengthen and modernise 
ENISA and reinforce cooperation across EU member states, law 
enforcement authorities and the industrial sector. Under its new mandate, 
ENISA would engage EU member states and private sector stakeholders in 
                                                     
40 ENISA came into being following the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on 10 March 2004. Operations 
started in Crete in September 2005, after a recruitment period in Brussels, and with 
the arrival of staff that were recruited through EU-wide selections. See 
www.enisa.europa.eu. 
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joint activities across Europe, such as cyber security exercises, public 
private partnerships for network resilience, economic analyses and risk 
assessment and awareness campaigns. A modernised ENISA would have 
greater flexibility and adaptability and would be available to provide EU 
countries and institutions with assistance and advice on regulatory matters.  
Finally, to respond to the increased intensity of cyber security 
challenges, the proposed Regulation would extend ENISA’s mandate for 
five years and gradually increase its financial and human resources. The 
Commission proposes that ENISA's governance structure also be 
strengthened with a stronger supervisory role of the management board, 
on which the EU member states and the European Commission are 
represented.  
Two of the achievements of ENISA are the completion of the 
European Information-Sharing and Alert System (EISAS) feasibility study 
(see Section 2.4.2.5 below) and the recent publication of the Country 
Reports on Network and Information Security (NIS), carried out by 
Deloitte, which provide a comprehensive 750 pages-plus overview of the 
status of NIS in 30 European countries, including identification of 
stakeholders and trends.41 The reports find that European countries are 
highly varied in how prepared they are for dealing with cyber crime, 
attacks and in terms of network resilience.  
2.5.2.5 The EISAS feasibility study 
ENISA was asked by the European Commission to analyse the current state 
of affairs as regards existing systems and initiatives across Europe that 
have the goal of disseminating appropriate and timely information on 
Network and Information Security (NIS) vulnerabilities, threats, risks and 
alerts, as well as sharing good practices. In addition, ENISA was 
empowered with the task of identifying possible sources of security 
information that could potentially contribute to an EISAS. This led to the 
publication of a first EISAS feasibility study in 2007.  
As reported by ENISA, in defining the most promising scenario for 
European involvement in this field, the study analysed first the findings of 
previous projects and other studies with a similar scope and second the 
status quo of the existing (national) information-sharing systems for home-
                                                     
41 See http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/press-releases/eu-agency-maps-key-
online-security-actors-strategies-good-practices-in-europe. 
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users and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Two types of involvement 
for the European Union (operating and facilitating) in the three parts of the 
information-sharing process (information gathering, processing and 
dissemination) were examined under three different perspectives 
(technical/organisational, political and social/cultural). 
The study concluded that the most effective level of involvement for 
the European Union in the establishment and operation of an information-
sharing system for its home-users and SMEs would be that of a facilitator; a 
moderator of discussion and a ‘keeper of good practice’. The report 
concludes with proposals for the next steps to be taken and a ‘proof of 
concept’ scenario. 
2.5.2.6 The digital agenda 
On 19 May 2010, the European Commission presented its Digital Agenda, 
which forms an integral part of the EU 2020 strategy launched by the 
second Barroso Commission. In the Agenda, significant emphasis is placed 
on the need to improve the security of information infrastructure. In more 
detail, the Commission presents two separate lines of action: 
• The “Key Action 6” entails the commitment to present measures in 
2010 aiming at a reinforced and high level Network and Information 
Security Policy, including legislative initiatives such as a modernised 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), and 
measures allowing faster reactions in the event of cyber attacks, 
including a CERT for the EU institutions; 
• The “Key Action 7” implies that the Commission will present 
measures, including legislative initiatives, to combat cyber attacks 
against information systems by 2010, and related rules on jurisdiction 
in cyberspace at the European and international level by 2013; 
In addition, the Commission plans to establish a European cyber 
crime platform by 2012; examine the feasibility by 2011 to create a 
European cyber crime centre; work with global stakeholders notably to 
strengthen global risk management in the digital and in the physical sphere 
and conduct internationally coordinated targeted actions against computer-
based crime and security attacks; and support EU-wide cyber-security 
preparedness exercises, from 2010. 
As regards the obligations that the Agenda places on member states, 
the Commission requires that national governments: 
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• Establish a well-functioning network of CERTs at national level 
covering all of Europe by 2012; 
• In cooperation with the Commission, carry out large-scale attack 
simulation and test mitigation strategies as of 2010; and 
• Set up or adapt national alert platforms to the Europol cyber crime 
platform, by 2012, starting in 2010. 
2.5.3 EU actions in the various phases of CIP 
EU policy initiatives have so far focused on the following phases of the CIP 
policy cycle: 
• Preparedness & prevention. The EP3R and the Pan-European Forum for 
Member States, together with initiatives on the Baseline Capabilities 
of National/Gov CERTs fall into this first phase of the CIP cycle.  
• Detection and response. The European Information-Sharing and Alert 
System (EISAS) provides a first step in this direction.  
• Mitigation and recovery. Pan-European exercises on large-scale network 
security incidents, National Contingency Plans and reinforced 
cooperation between national/governmental CERTs all contribute to this 
phase.  
In addition, international cooperation was stimulated by the adoption 
of principles and guidelines on long-term internet resilience and stability. 
The European Commission is also very active in the funding of research in 
the field of CIP.42 
 
  
                                                     
42 For an overview of current projects being funded, see Marino and Skordas 
(2010), EU research on critical infrastructure protection - CIP, European CIIP 
Newsletter, April/May 2009, Volume 5, Number 1.  
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CHAPTER 2: MAIN FINDINGS 
• The definition of critical infrastructure is still a moving target, and the 
boundaries between CIP and CIIP are a moving frontier. Countries 
have adopted slightly different definitions, different governance 
patterns and different forms of public-private partnerships to address 
the issue.  
• The role of critical information infrastructure and its relevance for CIP 
policy is on the increase, leading also to more interplay between cyber-
security and CIP policy. This also means that global problems still rely 
on very local competences and remedies: such a structural bias between 
‘attack’ and ‘defence’ is what makes CIs globally interdependent 
nowadays.  
• The key players in CIP policy – governments, specialised response 
teams, analysis, communication and reporting centres, the private 
sector, PPPs, sectoral regulators and political institutions – play very 
different roles in different countries, making international cooperation 
difficult.  
• The key phases of the CIP event cycle are i) analysis and assessment; ii) 
remediation; and iii) indications and warnings, before the adverse event 
occurs. In addition, they include: iv) mitigation; v) incident response; 
and vi) reconstitution, after the event has occurred. It is important, 
however, to realize that real life events seldom come as isolated events; 
accordingly, referring to successions of events and, more generally, to 
the crisis life-cycle would be more appropriate. 
• In the ex ante phase of CIP policy, infrastructure risk assessment plays a 
key role, and should be subject to further research and standardisation. 
Key parameters can already be identified both for CIP and CIIP, but 
more widely adopted standards would certainly strengthen 
international cooperation and the dissemination of best practices.  
• At national level, CIP policy is increasingly: i) focused on resilience and 
an all-hazards approach; ii) centralised in one single body; and iii) 
focused on the cyber-dimension of the issue.  
• EU actions in this domain – including the EP3R and the European 
Forum of member states – contribute to some of the phases of the CIP 
cycle, namely preparedness and prevention, detection and response, 
and mitigation/recovery.  
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3. IDENTIFYING THE POLICY CHALLENGE 
he CIP domain exhibits a number of potential challenges for the 
policy-maker. In this section we illustrate the main economic issues 
behind the critical infrastructure protection problem, focusing in 
particular on the economics of CIP (Section 3.1, below) and on the issue of 
identifying and classifying risk to obtain more effective CIP strategies 
(Section 3.2). Section 3.3 then presents an analysis of sectoral specificities, 
potentially warranting an ad hoc approach. Section 3.4 concludes by 
translating our findings into policy recommendations to be further 
elaborated in Section 4, below.  
3.1 The economics of C(I)IP 
An often-neglected dimension of critical infrastructure protection in Europe 
is the economic one. Few attempts have been made in Europe to obtain a 
systematic and comprehensive analysis of the economics behind CIP and 
CIIP policy.43 On the other hand, information security economics has 
become a thriving research area in academia.44 
The CEPS Task Force reflected on the issue from a number of 
perspectives, and reached the following conclusions:  
? An efficiency-security trade-off 
One important economic problem behind the current exposure to systemic 
risk is the efficiency-security trade-off related to the increased reliance on 
interconnected infrastructures. According to this view, our increased 
independence on critical infrastructure has led to an over-exposure to risk 
due to the need to achieve productive efficiency, i.e. achieving a given 
                                                     
43 A notable exception is the report entitled “Security Economics and the Internal 
Market” by Prof. Ross Anderson, Rainer Böhme, Richard Clayton and Tyler Moore 
for ENISA in February 2008, available online at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
act/sr/reports/econ-sec/economics-sec.  
44 See, i.a., Moore, T., R. Clayton, and R. Anderson, The Economics of Online Crime, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, N. 3, summer 2009, pp. 3–20. See also 
http://infosecon.net/workshop/bibliography.php for a comprehensive 
bibliography on information security.  
T
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objective at the lowest possible cost. One example in this respect is public-
private partnerships to build infrastructure such as motorways: in many 
European countries, from Hungary to Portugal, the absence of private 
incentives to use quality materials to build the road infrastructure has led 
the asset to perish very quickly, because the revenues associated with the 
execution of contractual obligations were not made dependent on any 
measure of reliability and sustainability over time.45 Likewise, the recent 
‘oil spill’ case off the coasts of Louisiana is a self-evident example of the 
absence of a ‘plan B’ when developing an infrastructure: the difficulty of 
improvising a recovery plan has caused enormous damage to the 
ecosystem. The trade-off between productive efficiency and security is all 
the more evident as the boundaries between CIP and CIIP have become 
increasingly blurred. As CIP expert Joe Weiss recently declared: 
When I was … involved in advanced controls and 
instrumentation, we viewed adding intelligence to the critical 
infrastructure as being a single-edge sword – nothing but 
productive improvements could accrue. We never realized that for 
all the positives there's a negative – “cyber”. It's a double-edged 
sword and you have to address that. If you don't, the 
consequences can be devastating. If you do, the benefits can be 
phenomenally valuable. It is a trade-off between productivity and 
security.46 
Figure 13, below shows the dimension of the trade-off, with increased 
efficiency often leading to just-in-time production chains, reduced 
maintenance efforts, stock capacities and staff, and – most importantly – a 
reduction in redundancies that are costly to preserve, but often also create 
potential alternatives in case of a major disruption to an infrastructure. 
                                                     
45 See i.a. Renda, A. and L. Schrefler (2006), Public-Private Partnerships. Models and 
Trends in the European Union. Study requested by the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection. 
46 See Interview with CNET, 10 May 2010, at http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-
20004505-245.html?tag=mncol;title (visited on November 5, 2010). Of course, the 
efficiency-resilience trade-off is not always a real dilemma. For instance, replacing 
rotary telephone switches with digital switches has significantly increased the 
robustness of the telephone network. Furthermore, migration from digital PSTN 
switching to Carrier VoIP has also increased, or at least not negatively affected, the 
robustness of the network. In any event, it is important to stress that the use of IT 
needs to be informed by the resilience requirements for the given service.  
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require the use of monitoring and/or data collection technology that may 
negatively affect individual privacy. The network security mechanisms 
such as firewalls or intrusion detection devices as well as SPAM filters are 
in a grey area, since they provide security and convenience to the user at 
the cost of monitoring high-level traffic; at the same time, it is also true that 
this monitoring does not result in permanent/long-term data storage and 
only portions of the network traffic that are used in routing the packets are 
inspected (as opposed to the human-readable contents).  
Similarly, some commentators have pointed to a growing tension 
between security and ease of use, which seems to be tipping in favour of 
the latter as a driver of enhanced demand by increasingly sophisticated 
customers. For example, Coucher (2010) recently wrote that:  
 
There are good commercial and operational reasons for the new or 
emerging networks and infrastructures such as ‘Cloud 
Computing’; satellite-based networks with broad and narrowcast 
services; merged mobile, internet and corporate networks. User 
demands for instant availability and access to all data sources and 
services are forcing a simplified and common approach – so-called 
‘convergence’ … The networks and database systems are designed 
to push data out as quickly and in as common a form as possible, 
rather than questioning the rights to access. Passwords are hidden, 
hard-coded, minimised or ignored in the rush to gain speedy 
access. So the balance of security and access is tipping towards 
ease of use, simplifying and minimising the overheads that would 
otherwise maintain separation and security, so creating a huge 
looming future vulnerability. 
 
It should be noted that in this case, if well designed, robust security 
architectures can provide a simple and user-friendly interface. If good 
security practices are followed, strong security does not have to sacrifice 
much ease of use – in fact, in certain cases strong security can actually 
result in improved ease of use.48 As in the case of privacy, the important 
lesson to be drawn is that security architects should be aware of possible 
consequences for privacy and ease of use when designing their systems.  
                                                     
48 For instance, the introduction of a strong 2-factor single sign on schemes makes it 
unnecessary for the user to remember multiple complex passwords.  
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? Principal-agent problems 
The efficiency-security trade-off can become more challenging, depending 
on how the infrastructure is owned and operated. Today’s environment, 
partly resulting from the wave of privatisations that has led to a major 
restructuring of a number of industries, entrusts private economic agents 
with the task of acting in line with the public goal of securing resilience of 
critical infrastructures. The divergence between private payoffs from 
economic activities and the public payoff from resilience may lead to 
principal-agent problems, where the goals pursued by the principal (the 
public sector) must be achieved through action by the agent (the private 
sector). This situation may lead to problems such as: i) the need to specify 
ways to understand steps taken by private parties in managing critical 
infrastructures; ii) asymmetry of information between principal and agent; 
iii) the need to build a constructive dialogue between public policy-makers 
and private economic agents; iv) the need, in regulated sectors, to reward 
investment in infrastructure resilience by ensuring that positive 
externalities (i.e. enhanced resilience) are internalised to some extent by the 
investors.49 
? Complexity and unpredictability 
From an economic perspective, the C(I)IP market exhibits a significant 
degree of incomplete information, i.e. economic actors normally do not 
possess all the information needed to take informed decisions on how to 
define and manage risk. Defining and managing risk has become 
increasingly difficult due to the complexity and unpredictability of the 
threats associated with the operation of a given infrastructure, as well as 
the interconnectedness of the CIs in place, which makes domino effects 
likely and increases the difficulty of locating the potential sources of system 
failure. This problem is particularly evident in the case of the so-called 
‘black swans’.50 Un- or very low predictability is the inherent difficulty of 
                                                     
49 See, i.a. Laffont and Martimort, The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-Agent Model, 
Princeton University Press, (2001). 
50 A ‘black swan’ is a highly improbable and hard to predict event, which may 
either have devastating or major beneficial consequences. The attacks of the twin 
towers of the World Trade Centre on 9/11/2001 was a so-called black swan. The 
rise of the internet is a more positive black swan. One could almost theorize that 
major changes in our world came from ‘black swans’.  
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these phenomena. Security experts know well that more damages will 
result from unanticipated events: statistics are inefficient to predict them, 
and accordingly black swans call for imagination, creativity, and ‘thinking 
the unthinkable’ type of foresight. 
? Positive and negative externalities 
The existence of positive externalities associated with the investment in 
infrastructure resilience limits the individual incentive to undertake such 
investments. This is often a result of externalities being generated in terms 
of enhanced security and resilience not being entirely captured by the 
investor, but accruing to society as a whole.51 The flip side of the coin is that 
the damage that would accrue to society in the case of a major accident 
caused by failure of a given infrastructure is unlikely to be fully 
internalized – this, in turn, leads to negative externalities stemming from 
insufficient investment in security and, consequently, suboptimal 
resilience.52 All in all, this creates a collective action problem, in which a 
collectively desirable action is not undertaken individually due to failure to 
coordinate individual activities and to allocate responsibility.  
? The potential role of liability 
In the law and economics literature, the existence of these externalities may 
require an examination of legal mechanisms, such as liability, for cases of 
negligence in the adoption of security measures.53 However, the definition 
of an optimal liability system based on negligence presupposes that 
optimal standards are identifiable with reasonable certainty, which is 
problematic due to the problem of incomplete information but also due to 
                                                     
51 See Varian, H. R. (2004), System Reliability and Free Riding, in Economics of 
Information Security, Kluwer. 
52 See, i.a. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and the Law: An Overview of 
Key Issues, National Academy of Sciences, at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/ 
10685.html.  
53 For a seminal contribution on this issue, see Guido Calabresi, The Costs of 
Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, New Haven: Yale University Press (1970). 
See also John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 Journal of 
Legal Studies (1973) pp.323-350; Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, 
Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press (1987); and Landes, W.M. and R. A. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University 
Press (1987).  
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the ex post and case-by-case nature of what constitutes negligence or 
diligence. This may warrant the introduction of alternative liability 
regimes, such as strict liability. It is important to note that there are limits in 
the case of CIP, due to the difficulties in establishing causation links and 
the multi-party, multi-risk environment in which CIP providers operate. 
The fact that domino and cascading effects may materialize in this field 
along with dependencies and mutual dependencies between different 
infrastructures makes the assessment of liability almost prohibitive in some 
circumstances. Among others, Dari Mattiacci (2003) explains that tort law 
generally fails to provide first-best internalization of both positive and 
negative externalities, and may have to be complemented by other legal 
instruments, such as the definition of homogeneous standards and – in 
some cases – subsidies.  
? An incomplete insurance market 
A related issue that stems directly from incomplete information, exposure 
to unknown risk and difficult allocation of liability is the current lack of a 
well-developed insurance market for CIP. Notwithstanding the growing 
exposure to risk of several businesses and administrations, the 
development of insurance policies for these types of risk has not led to a 
more refined understanding of their nature, probability or the effectiveness 
of any countervailing measures. A more mature insurance market would 
certainly prove essential for the production of information on several issues 
such as: i) the nature and extent of certain risks; ii) the consequences that 
can derive in financial and economic terms from given behaviour by 
businesses or public authorities; and iii) the remedies that can prove more 
effective in reducing the negative impact of given occurrences. For 
example, if insurance companies were ready to grant discounts in their 
premium in case a business A adopts a given product x to protect itself 
from cyber attacks, this would automatically provide information on the 
effectiveness of product x in limiting the exposure of A.54 
                                                     
54 Baer, W.S. (2003), Rewarding IT Security in the Marketplace, in: TPRC 2003.Keysan, 
Majuca and Jurcic (2004) state that “cyberinsurance results in higher security 
investment, increasing the level of safety for information technology (IT) 
infrastructure. Second, cyberinsurance facilitates standards for best practices as 
cyberinsurers seek benchmark security levels for risk management decision-
making. Third, the creation of an IT security insurance market redresses IT security 
market failure resulting in higher overall societal welfare. We conclude that this is 
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The absence of a mature market is also justified by the fact that the 
insurance industry inevitably faces a number of problems when assessing 
CIP-related risks and the consequent premium level. Furthermore, with 
insufficient information about the causes, nature and features of current 
threats, insurance companies would inevitably expose themselves to moral 
hazard and adverse selection, which would lead to inefficient contracts 
and potential losses on their side.55 The current reaction in the industry 
seems to be the introduction of fairly low maximum coverage, which 
provides very partial compensation if the event occurs.56 
? Rational ignorance 
A potential imperfection in the CIP market is due to the cost of gathering 
information ex ante, which hampers the attempt to invest in prevention in a 
way that would maximize the amount of information available before the 
event, and thus also maximize preparedness. The problem here is one of 
‘rational ignorance’, i.e. a situation in which it is rational not to acquire all 
                                                                                                                                       
a significant theoretical foundation, in addition to market-based evidence, to 
support the assertion that cyberinsurance is the preferred market solution to 
managing IT security risks”. See The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance, at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=uiuclwps.  
55 Moral hazard occurs when a party insulated from risk behaves differently than it 
would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. A typical example occurs in 
insurance contracts against theft, whenever full coverage leads the insured party to 
pay insufficient attention to his property. Adverse selection refers to a situation in 
which suboptimal results occur because buyers have asymmetric information: for 
example, if buyers only know the average quality of the goods sold in a given 
marketplace, and are not able to distinguish between good quality and bad quality 
products, they will not be willing to pay any additional price for supposedly good 
products. This will progressively lead better-than-average products out of the 
market, and worse-than-average products to survive. See Akerlof, George A. 
(1970). The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press) 84 (3): 488–500. For an application 
to the CIP policy domain, see Shetty, N., G. Schwartz, M. Felegyhazi and J. 
Walrand, Competitive Cyber-insurance and Internet Security, Economics of 
Information Security and Privacy, 2010, 229-247. 
56 See presentation by Simon Milner of Lloyd’s at the CEPS Task Force 5th meeting.  
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the information that would potentially be available to policy-makers and 
private actors prior to the event.57 
Figure 14, below shows a graphical representation of the rational 
ignorance concept. All else being equal, the more costly the information, 
the lower the amount of information that is optimal according to an ex ante 
cost-benefit analysis of information acquisition (so-called ‘sweet spot’ in the 
figure).  
Figure 14. Rational ignorance 
 
The concept of rational ignorance demonstrates that action both 
before the event and after the event is warranted to maximize the 
preparedness and reaction potential of a given system.58 
? Systematic biases in hazard prevention 
A related issue in the analysis of behavioural patterns in CIP is that of 
systematic decision-making biases, which is intimately linked with 
                                                     
57 See, for a seminal contribution on the issue, George J. Stigler, The Economics of 
Information, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69, Issue 3, 213-225 (1961). 
58 In addition, issues related to corporate secrecy and national interest do not allow 
access to more information in many circumstances. 
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behavioural economics and cognitive science.59 In particular, Kunreuther et 
al (2008) analyze what they call the “psychology of hazard prevention”.60 
Behaviours such as the systematic underestimation of low-probability high 
impact events, budgeting heuristics, learning failures, endowment effects 
and path dependency all point in the direction of a risk of under-
investment in CIP especially by private parties.61 Although a complete 
analysis of those behavioural biases would fall outside the scope of this 
report, suffice it to recall that most of them depend on the need to make 
decisions on incomplete information, as well as on the need to compare 
upfront costs with uncertain future benefits, which depend on the 
individual perception of the magnitude of the uncertain event, as well as 
the likelihood that it will actually occur. In most cases, these systematic 
biases call for public intervention, as private individuals would not be able 
to reach optimal decisions in isolation.  
3.2 Measuring risk: Building common metrics 
The several imperfections existing in the CIP ‘market’ – which may exhibit 
peculiarities also on a sectoral basis – call for action to improve the 
availability of information on the basis of which risk can be classified, 
analysed and mitigated. This, in turn, might also help the development of a 
(more) mature insurance market for the different risks connected to the 
operation of a critical infrastructure, something that today – as illustrated in 
the previous section – is still missing.  
More specifically, the CEPS Task Force has discussed, with the help 
of experts, the problem of how to i) define an ontology of risk; ii) establish 
appropriate risk metrics, from an operational, organisational and technical 
perspective; and iii) how to define vulnerability parameters and a 
framework for risk management.  
                                                     
59 See: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/C2009_HK,RJM,EMK.pdf 
August 2009. 
60 Idem.  
61 Risk assessment becomes almost prohibitive in cases of very low probability. See, 
i.a. Taleb, N. N. (2007), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New 
York, Random House, 2007, 366 pages. In some circumstances, the risk calculation 
is not feasible, since near zero likelihood times near infinite cost do not fulfil the 
statistical requirements to be applied. And see supra, note 52 and associated text. 
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The main results of the debate in the CEPS Task Force imply two 
important recommendations. First, it is necessary to increase 
standardization in the taxonomy of risks as well as in the definition of 
available metrics. Secondly, the definition of a global framework for risk 
management is needed.  
As a preliminary remark, as stated by one of the Task Force 
participants, the minimal requirements that a methodology for risk 
assessment of CI should meet are as follows:62 
• Identification of current risks 
• Possibility of performing threat and vulnerability analysis on 
the CI and its components and also at the level of 
interdependencies and services when ICT are involved. 
• Risk quantification: R = R (IE, S) → (C, L) 
• Enumeration of operation scenarios (S). 
• Identification of initiating events (IE) and protection measures. 
• Unambiguous evaluation of consequences (C). 
• Calculation of likelihood (L) based on available data. 
• Risk management 
• Comparison of result of risk quantification versus tolerable risk. 
• Identification of protection measures that prevent/detect/ 
respond to the identified ‘initiating events’ (IE), in order to 
reduce risk to a tolerable level. 
• Global approach to risk reduction versus local approach. 
• Identification of foreseeable risks 
• Analyse/prevent changes in scenarios, initiating events, etc. 
In addition, the basic principle of risk management must identify 
those protection measures that reduce the risk for the benefit of society and 
not only for business. Finally, since protection measures to reduce risk may 
involve several CI operators and may be more than one country, it is 
                                                     
62 Filippini (European Commission, Joint Research Centre), presentation at the 
CEPS Task Force, CEPS, Brussels.  
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important to decide in advance who is going to pay for the implementation 
of identified risk reduction measures. In particular, given that in most 
European CIs EU-level coordination is required, it might also make sense 
for the EU (perhaps the agency whose creation we are proposing) to 
distribute funding in a way that results in the greatest impact to the 
protection of European CIs. 
3.2.1 Risk metrics 
Approaches to risk metrics needed to facilitate the identification and 
assessment of risks to include the following types:63 
• Operational metrics – assess how well the organisation’s formal 
policies and procedures are implemented by staff members; 
• Organisational metrics – assess the adequacy of the standards, 
policies, and procedures adopted to enhance security; 
• Technical metrics – assess the adequacy of the security being 
imposed to protect specific components of personal communications 
systems (PCS); the metrics of day to day system security; 
• Brainstorming metrics – used in some cases to assess the ‘big picture 
type of metrics’.64 
Last, it should be based on existing security standards whenever 
applicable, with extensions for specific sector-driven domains. In 
particular, the following standards already exist and are in use in the field 
of CIIP and risk assessment/management: 
• ISO/IEC 27000 and NIST 800-53. These standards are used in many 
CIIs for security metrics taxonomy.65 They are focused on 
management of IT security and general IT technologies, and can 
provide sufficient solutions for the ‘Enterprise ICT’ domain. 
However, they provide only partial coverage for the ‘Sector-Specific’ 
domains that need to be addressed within the broader CIP policy. 
                                                     
63 See Ronda Henning et al., Proceedings of the Workshop on Information Security 
System Scoring and Ranking, Applied Computer Security Associates, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, May 21-23, 2001, http://www.acsac.org/measurement 
/proceedings/wisssr1-proceedings.pdf.   
64 Source: VTT Technical Research Centre, Finland.  
65 ISO 27004:2009 was intended to define metrics associated with ISO 27000 
standards.  
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• ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.01-2004. The TR99.1 is focused on “Security 
Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems” (ANSI 2004). 
It provides a categorization and discussion of metrics primarily 
directed at the PCS domain, and may help refine the overall metrics 
categorisation or framework offered by ISO/NIST.  
Figure 15, below shows two examples of metrics development: a) the 
categorization of metrics by the National SCADA test bed; and b) the 
Security Metrics Development framework by the Institute for Information 
Infrastructure Protection (I3P).  
Figure 15. NSTB library and the I3P Security Metrics Development framework 
(a) (b) 
 
Source: Adar, E. presentation at the CEPS Task Force, CEPS. Brussels, based on  (a) “I3P  
Research Report No. 1. (2005) - Process Control System Security Metrics”. (b) “I3P 
Report No. 12, (2007) - Security Metrics Tools Final Report”. 
In terms of risk assessment for critical (information) infrastructures, 
several methodologies are available, as amply described in the literature. 
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Risk assessment methods such as the Hierarchical Holographic Model 
(HHM), the Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM), and the Risk Filtering 
and Ranking Method (RFRM) have been applied successfully to SCADA 
systems with many interdependencies and have highlighted the need for 
quantifiable metrics. Probability risk analysis (PRA) includes methods such 
as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FEMA). For example, Ralston et al. (2007) 
discuss two recent methods (one based on compromise graphs and one on 
augmented vulnerability trees) that quantitatively determine the 
probability of an attack, the impact of the attack, and the reduction in risk 
associated with a particular countermeasure. Figure 16 below shows an 
example of vulnerability tree analysis developed by these authors. 
Figure 16. Example of vulnerability tree 
 
Source: Ralston et al. (2007). 
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3.2.2 A global framework for risk management 
Assessing the risk level related to a given critical infrastructure by using a 
comprehensive, all-hazards approach has become a priority, in order to 
allow a better flow of information and increase the efficiency of the market 
and the risk management capacity of private and public actors. Figure 17, 
below shows an example of risk evaluation matrix for CIIP, tailored to the 
IT world, which is supposed to yield a determination of the risk rate related 
to a given infrastructure. 
The integration of impact parameters of the IT assets related to the 
given infrastructure enables a more accurate quantification of the risk level. 
Such parameters include: hierarchy of the IT asset within its business 
process, the way it may affect other CI layers and the type of impact. The 
evaluation takes into consideration not only the immediate impact on the 
IT world, but also the potential consequences in relation to the given 
infrastructure. This process enables a better understanding of the nature of 
the IT risk, and subsequently, an appropriate illustration of remediation 
activities.  
Figure 17. A risk evaluation matrix for CIIP 
 
Source: E Adar, www.wck-grc.com (2010). 
As shown on the left of the figure, the type of vulnerability, threat 
and attacker are translated into a computed likelihood rate matrix, which 
constitutes an input to the determination of the risk rate. The other input – 
represented on the right-hand side – is the computed Asset Impact Rate 
matrix, which incorporates information related to the ‘CIA’ impact, an 
assessment of the remediation level, the type of impact, as well as the level 
of intra-dependency of the critical infrastructure at hand. 
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A global framework for CIP risk management could assist the 
industry by sharing information, procedures and best practices. In 
particular, it could facilitate: 
• The development of common assessment methods, working 
procedures, libraries of controls and metrics (thresholds can be 
discussed on country or enterprise levels); 
• Typical threats and attack scenarios, its characteristics and 
probability; 
• Typical vulnerabilities scenarios, unknown vulnerabilities; 
• Typical key IT processes for each sector; 
• European aspects for each sector. 
3.3 Assessing the EU’s preparedness: Sectoral views 
One of the key roles of the public sector in CIP is the analysis of the 
preparedness of specific sectors. Debate in the CEPS Task Force revealed 
that different sectors may exhibit different needs when it comes to the 
adoption of prevention and remediation methods, as well as for risk 
identification, assessment and management purposes. One example of 
assessment of the different levels of preparedness in different CIP domains 
is offered by a recent Government Accountability Report in the US, as 
shown in Figure 18 below. 
Figure 18. Comprehensiveness of sector-specific plans in the US 
 
Source: GAO Report, GAO-08-64T, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0864t.pdf 
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In 2008, a survey of 199 leading experts in the CIP sector by Secure 
Computing yielded important results, in particular pointing to the energy 
sector as the one perceived as the most vulnerable and likely to be attacked 
in years to come.  
Figure 19. Results of a survey 
 
At the EU level, the analysis of preparedness in the 27 member states 
is still in its infancy. Below, we report the specific problems that emerged 
during the course of the CEPS Task Force meetings for a number of sectors, 
from financial services to energy, telecoms and IT. 
3.3.1 Financial services 
In the financial services sector, the main problems identified are intimately 
linked with the protection of the IT infrastructure. For example, global 
companies such as Swift rely on dedicated networks, resilience plans and 
service-level agreements (SLAs) in order to ensure business continuity in 
all parts of the globe.  
A major research project termed PARSIFAL (Protection and Trust in 
Financial Infrastructures) has reached eight policy recommendations, 
which are summarized below, in Table 5.  
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Table 3. PARSIFAL main recommendations 
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CEPS Task Force participants advocated for a twofold strategy in the 
financial services sector, aimed at coupling a national public-private 
partnership (PPP) with a Global Industry specific Partnership.66 On the one 
hand, engaging in national public-private partnerships allows a better 
understanding of interdependencies in order to mitigate asymmetric 
surprises; in addition, it allows for a better monitoring of the supply chain 
of resources, and triggers effective regulatory advice and knowledge 
exchange.  
Moreover, forming a global industry-specific partnership and intelligence 
centre is more controversial since it shares the potential shortfalls of 
national PPPs, but probably exhibits a higher administrative burden (due 
to the need for at least one interface per country of operation) and may 
feature conflicting objectives, despite the general wish of all participants to 
increase security. Also, the operation of a global partnership may be 
hampered by the excessively different knowledge base at the operational 
level, by the limited added value of the public sector in ‘never owned’ 
sectors and the questionable ability of international coordination given the 
vast complexity of the subject matter and the wide territorial coverage.  
Coupling the two modes of governance would probably allow for 
maximum information-sharing, while still protecting the privacy 
requirements of firms. However, the problems in designing the global PPP 
would have to be carefully tackled beforehand.  
3.3.2 Energy 
In the energy field, the need to reduce costs and ensure security of supply 
may lead to conflicting public policy goals, and insufficient incentives on 
the side of private actors to invest in enhanced infrastructure resilience and 
robustness. Security of supply, climate and environmental concerns and the 
need to secure the affordability of energy for residential and business 
customers from what is termed the energy ‘trilemma’ (see Figure 20, 
below). 
                                                     
66 Presentation by Kai Jensen-Kusk, CEPS Task Force, CEPS, Brussels.  
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Figure 20. The energy trilemma 
 
Source: Zafiriou (2010). 
Security of supply is a cornerstone for economic development.  Risks 
to energy supplies involve three components: 
• Risks of targeted attacks on ‘critical infrastructure’ (e.g. terror, 
hacker); 
• Influence of non EU-countries; 
• Security of resources/raw-materials. 
Zafiriou (2010) also explained the two different possible reasons for 
electricity supply disruptions: 
• A major failure due to violation of system parameters (e.g. system 
breakdown due to frequency collapse after outage of technical 
equipment beyond (n-1)-security). The main characteristics of this 
type of incident are: i) the large-area supply disruption; ii) the 
absence of significant additional damage to network and other 
infrastructure assets; iii) relatively short-term recovery of supply 
expected (hours); and iv) reconstruction via “system re-
configuration” (no additional resources needed). 
• Failure due to destruction of key infrastructure (e.g. extreme weather 
conditions (snow, storm, flood) or targeted attacks). This type of 
incident possesses different features, such as: i) in general there is no 
system breakdown; ii) regional limited areas affected; iii) relatively 
long-term failure of supply possible (days/weeks); iv) reconstruction 
takes place via additional resources (material, personal). 
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A coherent framework for CIP is crucial as there are potential 
conflicts among the factors in the trilemma.   
Table 4. Market-based v. security-based issues in the energy field 
 
Source: Zafiriou (2010). 
 
3.3.3 IT and the cloud 
In the case of the IT industry (including telecoms), the most broadly 
acknowledged emerging issue is that of the security and resilience of cloud 
computing resources.67 Today, the issue of cloud resilience is emerging as 
one of the key factors that will drive the future of the internet in years to 
come. Programmes such as IBM’s “Resilient Cloud Validation”, which 
evaluates the resilience of cloud service provider environments using a 
rigorous set of benchmarking and design validation programs, leading to a 
certification by IBM; or the Cloud Security Alliance, which promotes best 
practices in cloud security assurance; or ICASI - the Industry Consortium 
for Advancement of Security on the internet (ICASI) – which relies on a 
multi-supplier common effort for global incident response by leveraging 
bilateral or multilateral response experts to manage complex issues. 
The main issue raised as regards cloud computing is that it adopts 
essentially a very efficient, though extremely centralized model. Cloud 
computing models transfer most of the computing work to centralised 
                                                     
67 Other important issues related to this sector include the lack of redundancy in 
the undersea cable infrastructure, DNS vulnerabilities and the need to migrate to 
DNSSEC, etc. For a comprehensive analysis see the 2007 Study on Availability and 
Robustness in Electronic Communications Infrastructure (ARECI), available online 
at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/strategy/activities/ciip/ 
areci_study/index_en.htm. 
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servers, leaving end users’ terminals as little more than ‘dumb’ terminals. 
This solution is seen as a cost-effective, but not always resilient solution. If 
we accept that ‘resilience design’ principles include concepts such as 
diversity, redundancy, decentralisation, transparency, collaboration, 
flexibility, openness and others, cloud computing may appear too 
centralised to match all the requirements.68 On the other hand, data centre 
security and mirroring of data centres may also make many cloud 
applications more resilient, especially compared to current solutions 
adopted by SMEs that lack specific skills and expertise. All in all, cloud 
computing seems to exhibit a different risk profile, which calls for the need 
to properly set up IDM and access management. These issues will have to 
be carefully taken into account and addressed before cloud computing 
becomes the dominant means of using IT resources.  
                                                     
68 See Jamais Cascio, Dark Clouds, at http://openthefuture.com/2009/01/ 
dark_clouds.html. See also Creane, M., Security: Why every cloud needs a resilient 
lining, BT White Paper, at http://globalservices.bt.com/static/assets/pdf/ 
white_papers/riskpaper_why_every_cloud_needs_a_resilient_lining_en.pdf.  
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CHAPTER 3: MAIN FINDINGS 
• The economics of CIP features important peculiarities, from the need to 
solve the efficiency-security trade-off to principal-agent problems, 
positive and negative externalities leading to possible market failure, 
the difficult but promising role of liability and insurance, and 
behavioural problems related to rational ignorance and bounded 
rationality. In addition, CIs feature a unique combination of low-
probability (due to existing protection measures) and very significant 
consequences of accidents. All these issues call for a coordinated public-
private intervention.  
• There is a strong need for establishing a common taxonomy, metrics 
and a common risk management framework for CIP-related risks and 
threats, possibly leading to a common framework for the CIP cycle 
overall. Standardisation in this domain – also relying on existing 
standards from e.g. ISO, NIST and ANSI – would significantly improve 
the circulation of best practices and the development of a mature 
insurance market.  
• The assessment of EU preparedness is still in its infancy, and is 
necessarily sector-specific. The different scale of emerging problems 
and risks may warrant different solutions in sectors that are more 
national in scope (e.g. transport) compared to others that feature more 
cross-country (inter-)dependencies (e.g. energy, e-communications).  
• Coupling national PPPs with a global partnership and intelligence 
centre in the financial sector would be the best way to increase the 
resilience of the financial infrastructure. However, global action is made 
very difficult due to the heterogeneity of potential participants, as well 
as conflicting interests, diverging knowledge bases and high transaction 
costs.  
• In the energy sector, security of supply, climate and environmental 
concerns and the need to secure the affordability of energy for 
residential and business customers form a peculiar ‘trilemma’ that must 
be solved by carefully balancing all the interests and incentives at stake. 
• In the IT sector, there is currently intense debate about cloud 
computing, especially in terms of its resilience and security. Excessive 
centralisation of computing may lead to more and essential dependence 
of networks and must be taken into account in the development of new 
business models.  
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4. ADDRESSING POLICY CHALLENGES: 
TOWARDS A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO 
C(I)IP 
n the previous sections we identified the policy problems related to the 
protection of critical infrastructure as lying in particular in the increased 
importance, complexity, interdependence and vulnerability of existing 
infrastructures; the increased importance of the information infrastructure; 
the need to build capacity and awareness and examine the possible role 
that incentives can play in the creation of an effective system of critical 
infrastructure protection.   
Against this complex background, any meaningful CIP policy should 
be based on the need to develop tools that are able to address the market 
failures that may emerge in different sectors. This means, specifically:  
? Providing a clear risk management and assessment framework to 
help address the informational asymmetry problem; 
? Promoting information-sharing between public policy-makers to 
reduce the informational asymmetry and create synergies and 
economies of scale and scope in identifying risks, vulnerabilities and 
(inter-)dependencies of critical infrastructures; 
? Building up a central CIP modelling and simulation centre for the EU 
to allow cross-border and multilateral infrastructure simulation, 
understanding complexity, dependencies and cascading effects; 
? Facilitating information-sharing and cooperation between public 
and private agents, to ensure coordination in promoting the public 
goal of securing resilience of critical infrastructures and 
dissemination of best practices; 
? Promote awareness-raising initiatives to ensure that actors at all 
layers of the CI value chain are sufficiently alerted of the importance 
of critical infrastructure protection, and mainstream CI protection in 
the policy process at EU and national level. 
? Take action to ensure that missing CIP profiles and skills are 
developed through university education, in order to avoid a shortage 
of key professional profiles on an issue that will increase in 
I
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importance in years to come. The development of the CIP 
professional knowledge and capability profile is especially important. 
Below, we explore these issues in more detail. Section 4.1 deals with 
the public policy issues related to inter-governmental cooperation and 
multi-level governance between the EU and member states. Section 4.2 
briefly hints at the transatlantic dimension by advocating stronger 
cooperation in the field of security and CIP within the existing 
Transatlantic Economic Council. Section 4.3 offers suggestions related to 
the upcoming EP3R, and Section 4.4 comments on the need for skills in the 
domain of C(I)IP as a public policy problem to be dealt with at the EU level. 
Section 4.5 discusses ways to mainstream critical infrastructure protection 
in the European Commission’s policy cycle.  
4.1 Shaping the public-private partnership 
Intervening in the field of CIP requires selecting – above all – the mode of 
intervention that proves most appropriate for the specifics of the problem 
at hand. The literature on regulatory reform and responsive regulation can 
help find the right way to intervene in this complex policy domain. In 
particular, social sciences have gone a long way towards providing 
guidance on the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of public policy intervention. For 
example, Ubacht (2010) refers to a scheme initially developed by Oftel, the 
UK telecommunications regulator, and advocates for the development of a 
co-regulatory scheme in the field of CIP. 
 
Table 5. Options for governance 
 
Source: Ubacht (2010), ECN newsletter (quoting Oftel). 
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Against this background, the most appropriate approach depends on 
the possibility of establishing an effective principal-agent scheme that ties 
the actions of public and private players to clearly defined objectives, and 
establishes incentive schemes and sanction mechanisms in case some of the 
involved parties deviate from the agreement reached. In addition, the 
choice of the best governance system also depends on:  
? The degree of informational asymmetry between public and private 
actors, as well the completeness of the information available to 
private players, including both local service providers and mostly 
global suppliers, each experiencing completely different problems 
and information.    
? The transaction cost that would emerge in an inter-governmental 
scheme, compared with the benefits that such a scheme may bring;   
? The (transaction) costs of a public-private partnership scheme, 
especially if compared to the corresponding benefits. 
? The degree of legal certainty that a given policy option would ensure 
for public and – most importantly – private players. 
In other words, the decision related to the most appropriate 
governance option is essentially a cost-benefit one, which should be subject 
to a careful impact assessment.  
Looking at the governance architecture, the CEPS Task Force hosted a 
lively debate that led to the identification of the need for a holistic approach 
to CIP policy. Figure 21, below shows the key foundations and pillars of 
CIP policy as described during CEPS Task Force meetings.  
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Figure 21. Key pillars of a CIP strategy 
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Source: Chris Gow, meeting 4. 
First, there is a strong need for an overall vision of what CIP should 
achieve both from an ex ante and ex post perspective (see above, Section 2.2), 
together with a strategy and strong political commitment to achieve the 
desired results. Such a vision should be disseminated among all 
stakeholders and CI owners/operators in order to promote awareness of 
the need for a CIP policy. Vision, strategy and awareness can be described 
as the essential foundations of any effective CIP policy.  
Second, the main pillars that must be built on the foundations 
described above include: 
? The development of standards and the sharing of best practices, 
which aim at solving – as far as possible – the problem of incomplete 
information that affects current CIP policies. This implies: 
o A thorough risk assessment aimed at the identification of gaps, 
and in particular the cases in which the lack of policies and 
standards causing a decrease in the ability to protect CIs;  
o the identification of key stakeholders, including both 
organisations, businesses and groups of individuals; 
o the identification of solutions based on interaction and 
agreement between stakeholders; and 
o the enactment of policies.  
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? The promotion of education and training initiatives, in order to fill 
the skills gap and contribute to raising the awareness of private and 
public operators as regards the importance of protecting critical 
infrastructure. This entails: 
o Efforts and investment in the field of education to improve and 
transform the academic environment, producing graduates (i.e. 
future workforce) with knowledge and skills targeted at CI 
development and protection; 
o Promote training initiatives to develop and constantly update 
the skills of the current a future workforce in a way that is 
commensurate with the needs of CI protection.  
o Sourcing efforts, to get the right people into the right jobs, 
including identification, tagging, placement, gap analysis, 
career development, and skills assessment.  
? Third, there is a need to promote research and development to 
constantly invent new technological solutions to effectively protect 
CIs. This requires, inter alia, continual gap analysis, identification and 
abridgement. R&D investment must be targeted at CIP needs, in 
particular when it comes to ensuring that evolving threats are given 
updated prevention and remediation strategies.  
? Fourth, information-sharing must be ensured to maximize the 
preparedness of CI owners/operators and speed up emergency 
responses. One of the key reasons for creating a public-private 
partnership for CIP is information-sharing. In this respect, it is 
essential to decide and define what information should be shared 
between private and public partners, and at what moment in time. 
Table 9, below shows the main dimensions of information-sharing, as 
emerging from the US debate and as potentially applicable to the EU 
PPP. 
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Table 6. Information-sharing in the US: Key dimensions 
What to share Who should 
share 
When to share Protecting 
information 
Government: 
? Threat 
intelligence 
? Warnings and 
advisories 
Private sector: 
? Vulnerabilities 
? Solutions  
? Advisories 
? Advice 
? Intelligence 
agencies 
? Law 
enforcement 
agencies 
? CI owners/ 
operators 
? Coordination 
partnerships (at 
all levels) 
Pre-event 
? Advisories 
? Warnings 
During and after 
the event 
? Remediation 
steps 
? Coordination of 
resources 
? Use of PKI 
(public key 
infrastructure) 
? Strong policies 
(with penalties 
for misuse) 
? Must protect 
both 
private/proprie
tary and 
government 
information 
Source: Ken Watson, meeting 4. 
The main components of information-sharing can be summarized as 
follows: 
? Coordination. To achieve better coordination actors must identify gaps 
in policies and standards, identify stakeholders, agree on solutions 
jointly, and enact policy through legislation.   
? Capability enhancement. This can be achieved through improvements 
in education, training, and sourcing (i.e. identifying the right roles 
and getting the best people into these roles).   
? Innovation through R&D. An effective R&D strategy includes 
identifying resources for R&D and establishing effective research 
processes. Research should be dedicated to analysing where CIP gaps 
exist. It should also contain a mechanism whereby the results of R&D 
can be subject to continuous feedback as well as be deployed. 
? A focus on funding/building capabilities that can be used by various trust 
models (or affinity groups) such as a secure conferencing capability, 
secure electronic communication, encrypted key exchange, etc. These 
common secure capabilities could be rolled together to facilitate the 
necessary trusted information-sharing needs by a particular group. 
? Common operational picture for information-sharing. As shown in 
Table 9, governments and industry should work together to establish 
who shares what, and when. The table offers some recommendations 
on how tasks could be divided among the public and private sector 
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for information-sharing, as well as what agencies could be involved 
in the process.   
? The final component is institutionalised trust. This can be achieved by 
establishing core competencies for government and the private sector, 
as well as mechanisms for governing information exchange. For 
example, trust must be built into the institutions so that when an 
employee leaves the replacement must be trusted quickly.69 
4.1.1 Focus: The trust dimension 
Compared with other policy domains, in CIP policy trust plays a very 
prominent role. Given the limited availability of information and the 
consequent need for information-sharing between governments, as well as 
between public and private players, building trust becomes the only 
possible way to develop a meaningful and coordinated CIP policy. 
However, several problems can emerge with respect to the objective 
of building reasonably long-term trust. 
? Intergovernmental trust may be limited in a global context, since some 
governments are often considered to be involved in cyber attacks 
aimed at stealing valuable information from other governments 
and/or private players – this problem may be less evident at the 
intra-EU level; 
? Supranational PPPs may face a problem of size. As pointed out by 
national experts in the CEPS Task Force, PPPs can obtain important 
results if the number of participants does not become excessive.70 
When the number and the national origin of participants increase, 
transaction and coordination costs, together with a lack of trust 
between parties, may skyrocket. This requires a novel approach that 
is more scalable than the existing national PPPs. If successful, it will 
serve as a model for a globally-scalable approach. 
                                                     
69 It needs to be noted however, that there are different trust models depending on 
the goals of the information-sharing activity – for example, sharing network sensor 
data related to a specific attack during a national incident has an entirely different 
trust model than sharing threat or vulnerability trend data related to the attacks 
seen over the past six months. The PPP should therefore be flexible enough to 
comprehend these various models. 
70 Presentation by Timo Hauschild, at the CEPS Task Force, Brussels.   
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? PPPs may be sector-specific by nature. For example, the optimal 
geographical dimension of a PPP on energy may be larger than a PPP 
on transportation networks, which tend to be more national in scope 
and exhibit a lower number of cross-border inter dependencies. And 
when it comes to the internet, clearly information-sharing and trust 
should be global, as the threats and risks coming from this 
infrastructure are virtually borderless.  
In all this, trust stands as a key concept. The CEPS Task Force has 
debated extensively the conditions for trust, from confidence to challenges, 
and reached the conclusion that trust needs specific rules, a key definition 
of roles and incentives, and the protection of information. In particular, in 
order to build trust there should be: 
? rules for the coordination of emergency responses. 
? persistent reputation and attribution. 
? balanced with effective privacy and personal data protection. 
? common metrics to ensure monitoring of efforts and results. 
Another aspect of information-sharing and intra-industry 
cooperation for CIP is the need to provide legal certainty for what concerns 
practices that are allowed, and those practices that may be considered as 
infringing existing rules such as, antitrust law, for example. At the EU level, 
more clarity would be needed, especially in those cases where information 
exchange potentially touches upon sensitive information such as price 
levels or technology choices, which may be interpreted by antitrust 
authorities as signs of collusion between competing firms.  
In the US, the Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107-296, Sec. 214) 
allows information defined as critical infrastructure information to be 
exempted from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Since the approach 
to information-sharing between competitors is more rigid in Europe than in 
the US in antitrust terms, action would be needed to clarify the conditions 
under which competing firms may be allowed to share critical 
infrastructure information (CII) without incurring antitrust sanctions.  
At the EU level, the recent European Commission impact assessment 
on the Communication on CIIP approaches the problems related to the 
creation of a PPP in an explicit way:71  
                                                     
71 See COM(2009)399 of 30.3.2009. 
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public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as the reference 
governance model because they seem the most reasonable 
mechanism to manage the peculiar combination and intersection 
of governments’ and private sector’s role and responsibilities. 
However, PPPs are quite challenging to implement in practice, as 
information exchange mechanisms between governments and the 
private sector basically become a trust issue … although there is a 
general consensus that PPPs … can be a workable solution, the 
European dimension of such an approach has not materialised so 
far. 
4.2 The EU policy-making process and CIP 
There was agreement among Task Force participants that the EU can play a 
leading role in facilitating global cooperation. In particular, the EP3R 
presents a key opportunity for Europe to engage local and global industry 
players in guiding and reviewing important aspects of emerging cyber 
policy. This is likely to result in the application of effective policy levers, 
ensuring that emerging technologies are well addressed, and ensuring 
alignment with other similar initiatives outside the EU. In this respect, 
Europe can also act as a model for the rest of the world.  
However, several critical factors stand on the way of the launch of a 
successful EP3R. In particular, the size of the expected PPP, the need to 
accommodate several diverging interests at the same table, the sectoral 
specificities that would have to be merged into a single platform, and the 
difficulty of allocating responsibility in what is still chiefly a national 
prerogative may prove very difficult issues to address, and could 
potentially undermine the success of this very welcome initiative. Below, 
we discuss the main obstacles to the development of a comprehensive and 
effective CIP policy in the EU, while Section 4.2.2 contains suggestions on 
how to mainstream CIP objectives into the broader context of EU policy-
making.  
To be sure, the EP3R will have to be complemented by actions at the 
policy level. Establishing a level playing field among Europe’s member 
states is crucial to defining a consistent and effective policy for CIIP.  
However, at this point individual member state priorities on CIP and CIIP 
differ widely and a careful approach to defining the right progressive goals 
and providing incentives to national governments is required to bridge the 
gap. 
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At the same time, European policy must address the fragmented 
approach to CIP across the member states decisively. A subsidiarity test 
must be applied to identify the functions that should exist at EU level and 
the ones that are most effectively addressed at member state level.   
In addition, what makes things even more difficult is that the level 
playing field that must be established between member states must be one 
that allows for a real paradigm shift in the way we think about security, 
resilience and disaster management (or response capabilities). The issue of 
critical infrastructure protection has today become so important that it 
must be effectively mainstreamed into the policy-making process of EU 
and national institutions.  
In many cases, this may provoke the emergence of policy trade-offs 
between the goal of increasing short-term static efficiency through cost-
cutting strategies (especially in times of financial crisis) and the need to 
ensure longer-term resilience and dynamic efficiency by providing a 
reasonably safe environment. The trade-off between short-term efficiency 
and resilience, however, is not the only one that is likely to emerge. As we 
have shown in this report, the objective of cyber security may clash with 
that of protecting users’ privacy and personal data on the internet (e.g., in 
case deep packet inspection is used), and a similar problem emerges also in 
many real-life situations. In addition, there may be a tension between the 
goal of preserving an open internet – in the extreme version so far adopted 
by some net neutrality advocates – and that of building a more secure 
cyberspace, where traffic is filtered to avoid spam, malware and easy 
attacks to the information and physical infrastructures on which our lives 
and businesses increasingly depend.  
To be sure, a reasonable C(I)IP policy should not only look at 
recovery measures and emergency response, but also focus on striking an 
efficient balance between prevention and cure. This also means that the 
“infrastructure of critical infrastructure protection” must be strengthened 
through the development of adequate skills in the labour market, and the 
creation of a fruitful interaction between players that shape CIP policy, 
from government to the private sector to CERTs/CSIRTs, ISACs, WARPs 
and many others. This, in turn, also means that responsibility for action to 
protect critical infrastructure should be efficiently allocated to the cheapest 
cost avoiders, and incentives to behave efficiently must be introduced into 
the legal system to a larger extent than occurs today. 
These are the challenges faced by many national governments around 
the world. Recent gatherings between CIP experts – including, most 
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notably, those organised by ENISA – have testified to a variety of national 
experiences, some of which have reached maturity and also relative 
success. In all this, the European Union faces the big challenge of having to 
coordinate 27 member states, some of which also have a federal structure; 
and the huge opportunity of becoming the leading force in this field by 
stimulating interaction and dialogue between private and public actors in a 
way that subsequently triggers a more global exchange.  Furthermore, an 
approach that will work across 27 EU member states will serve as an 
excellent model for addressing similar challenges globally. 
4.2.1 Policy recommendations for EU CIP policy in the future 
While recognizing that the European Commission is already very active in 
many fields of CIP, with encouraging prospects, the CEPS Task Force 
recommends that increased attention be given to the following aspects of 
future CIP policy. 
4.2.1.1 Perform a thorough, forward-looking subsidiarity test 
Subsidiarity is a well-established principle in EU policy-making, and 
postulates that policy action be taken at the most efficient level within a 
multi-level governance context. In the case of CIP policy, many policy 
actions are currently taken at national level, but the need to reach synergies 
and economies of scale in information-sharing, the increasing 
interdependence between infrastructures and between countries, as well as 
the inter-links between physical infrastructure and the information 
infrastructure create a strong argument for coordination of CIP policy at 
the international level. This is why the European Commission should run a 
thorough, in-depth subsidiarity test to clearly identify areas where acting in 
common (between the EU27) is more desirable, and areas that may remain 
under national competence in CIP, CIIP and for each of the sectors 
involved. 
In the impact assessment on the Communication on CIIP mentioned 
above, the European Commission observes that:  
Because of the high interconnectedness between CII and societal 
systems, which rely upon CII, it is unfeasible, ineffective and 
counterproductive, and would run against the basic principles 
underlying the European Union, for each member state to only 
guard its own backyard. Certain failures in one member state will 
unavoidably produce effects in another. This is why it is necessary 
for all the member states to coordinate their efforts in one direction 
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and to try and achieve a satisfactory level of preparedness with a 
similar timescale …For the reasons stated above, the proposed 
policy action fully respects the principle of subsidiarity, in its dual 
dimension of respect for the added-value test (it would be difficult 
for any member state to achieve the objective by itself) and of the 
boundary test (European action will be limited to what member 
states cannot achieve satisfactorily by themselves, providing a 
framework for coordination and, where appropriate, 
complementing their activities). 
A subsidiarity test must draw the line between what is to be done at 
the EU level and what will remain under the control of national 
governments. In this respect, it must be recalled that the European 
Commission already identified as European critical infrastructure the CIs 
that affect two or more member states. In carrying out the subsidiarity test, 
however, the Commission should also carefully look at existing domino 
effects and interdependencies between infrastructures, a domain in which 
we reportedly do not have sufficient information today. For example, a 
pure national transport network may be attacked as a way to create a 
disruption of a cross-border energy network: in this case, also the operation 
of national CIs that are interconnected with European or global CIs should 
be subject to procedural obligations and minimum resilience standards.  
The internet, which is emerging as the next Critical Infrastructure, is an 
example of an infrastructure that cannot be effectively governed at the 
national level. 
4.2.1.2 Centralise EU CIP governance 
The European Commission and EU bodies in charge of CIP policy are well 
aware of the importance of an all-hazards approach, which takes into 
account all types of risks and threats, independently of whether they come 
from natural events or are purely man-made. In line with a consolidated 
trend in many national governments, an efficient treatment of information 
flows and emergency responses require that the governance of CIP policy 
be centralised in the hands of a single institution. The EU must thus 
empower a single agency to deal with CIP and CIIP issues, given the 
increasing interlinks between the two domains (another consolidated trend 
in many countries). 
In order to be fully effective in its mission, the institution responsible 
for the EU CIP must have full mandate for: 
• Managing the process of identification European CI; 
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• Driving sectoral risk assessment on the identified EU CI; 
• Collecting data from public and private players to enable sustainable 
risk identification, assessment and management as regards European 
CI; 
• Managing the process of prioritizing gaps and investment; 
• Distributing funds and incentives to maximize the benefit to EU; 
• Continually assessing the level of European preparedness; 
• Coordinating response to events that affect European CI. 
Furthermore, the organisation will need to establish trusted working 
relationships with member state organisations responsible for national CIP 
as well as national and international private sector CI operators. 
4.2.1.3 Make it possible to ‘call the EU’ 
Many of the CEPS Task Force participants highlighted the fact that, in the 
event of warnings or an actual crisis, it is currently impossible to ‘call the 
European Union’. This problem should be addressed by the Commission in 
the months to come, also in light of the need for a more coordinated and 
centralised CIP policy at the EU level. In more detail, the EU must launch a 
‘Call EU’ hotline for emergency management and early warning, located in 
the agency in charge of CIP and CIIP (see above), to ensure that 
predetermined protocols agreed between national public institutions are 
triggered and coordinated from the central EU level. This capability should 
feature a method for sharing information related to threats and 
vulnerabilities in a timely manner with EU member national responders. 
Such a channel to push information out in a timely and coordinated 
manner across the EU would be a great improvement. 
In addition, legal responsibility should be attributed to the central EU 
line for failure to react and/or follow predetermined procedures to ensure 
timely and effective emergency prevention/response. 
4.2.1.4 Keep the PPP small and sector-specific 
Participants to the CEPS Task Force highlighted the problem of size in the 
creation of a successful PPP. The public-private partnership must be 
structured in a way that does not lead to an excessively large group, and is 
potentially structured on a sectoral basis, with interactions between sectors 
aimed at locating interdependencies. Given the increasing importance of 
the information infrastructure for almost all physical infrastructures, it 
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would be important to secure the presence and help of organising IT 
suppliers (including the global vendors and integrators), which improves 
the quality and timeline of the support and facilitates negotiation between 
stakeholders.  
Moreover, also based on our reasoning in Section 4.1.1 above, 
governance of the PPP may end up being impossible if transaction costs 
and administrative burdens related to its operation skyrocket. This, in turn, 
would also create a trust problem due to conflicting interests, different 
levels of knowledge and potential free riding behaviour. Accordingly, it 
would be advisable to give the PPP a clear focus and goals, and then 
organise the work in a reasonable group size on a sectoral basis or in a still 
more fragmented fashion.  
4.2.1.5 Develop common risk metrics and standards 
The European Commission has a unique opportunity to lead the 
development of common standards that would facilitate the flow of 
information and the achievement of economies of scale in CIP policy, both 
in and outside the territory of the Union. As discussed in Section 3 above, 
CIP policy – also given the structural gap between attack and defence in 
terms of information gathering and scope of action – urgently needs a 
degree of standardisation in the identification, classification and treatment 
of risks and threats. 
Accordingly, the EU should promote the development and adoption 
of common risk metrics and standards for risk identification, assessment 
and management in the field of CIP and CIIP. EP3R emerges as the right 
forum to initiate this process. 
This, in turn, would also facilitate the development of a mature 
insurance market, which would help to disseminate and update market 
information on existing risks and remedies in a timely and efficient way. 
4.2.1.6 Adopt a flexible policy approach 
Threats, risks and technologies that revolve around the protection of critical 
infrastructure constantly evolve, making it difficult to adopt a traditional 
‘command and control approach’ to policy-making. As already mentioned, 
the need to provide for efficient prevention and remediation phases 
involves both a constantly updated set of information, as well as the strong 
participation of the CI owners/operators and their key supply chain 
partners. Hence, a flexible approach to policy is essential. More specifically, 
the approach to CIP policy at the EU level could usefully draw the existing 
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‘new approach to standardization’, a policy approach that stands as one of 
the most successful reforms enacted in the history of the EU. This approach 
entails establishing through primary legislation only the general principles 
and main outcomes sought through EU CIP policy, and leaving it to the 
industry to devise the best technical measures (at any given point in time) 
that fulfil the desired levels of resilience.   
4.2.1.7 Address the ‘skills gap’ 
As observed in Section 3 above, both R&D and education policies are 
essential pillars of a comprehensive CIP policy. At the EU level, there is 
currently too little attention paid to the need to develop education and 
training curricula to ensure that the growing demand for an 
interdisciplinary profile able to deal with complex CIP issues is satisfied. 
The EU, through its framework programmes for research and its education 
policy, should provide incentives and funding to universities that want to 
offer higher education and lifelong training in these fields.   
4.2.1.8 Develop common modelling and simulation capabilities 
The recently launched Digital Agenda for Europe already highlights the 
need to carry out large-scale attack simulation and test mitigation strategies 
as of 2010. In this respect, the need to exploit synergies and reach adequate 
economies of scale in the understanding and detection of threats and risks, 
as well as in mitigation and remediation strategies leads to the need to 
build up a central CIP modelling and simulation centre for the EU. This 
would be an essential step to allow cross-border and multilateral 
infrastructure simulation, understanding complexity, dependencies and 
cascading effects. 
A good example of a research project that looks at existing 
capabilities for simulation is the DIESIS project, also presented at the CEPS 
Task Force. The project final report recognises that “in contrast to the 
utmost importance of critical infrastructures like electricity and 
telecommunication for all European citizens, the European economy and 
the European society at large, the understanding of the complex system of 
critical infrastructures with all their dependencies and interdependencies is 
still immature”.72 In order to address these challenges, DIESIS proposes to 
                                                     
72 See the DIESIS report on available infrastructure simulators, at 
http://www.diesis-project.eu/include/Documents/Deliverable2.3.pdf  
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establish the basis for a European modelling and simulation e-
infrastructure based upon open standards to foster and support research 
into all aspects of critical infrastructure with a specific focus on its 
protection. Developing modelling and simulation tools that enable a better 
understanding of the interdependency of European critical infrastructures 
is a prerequisite for an adequate solution for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) strategies. 
The DIESIS project was funded by the European Union 7th 
Framework Programme for Research, and led to important technical and 
non-technical results, including i) an ICT architecture and a work flow for 
member states and administrations in CIP; ii) an interoperability 
middleware for CI simulators; iii) a communication middleware for 
distributed federated simulation via the internet; iv) an ontology for CI in 
railway transport, electrical power transmission, and telecommunication; 
v) a working demonstrator, a distributed federated simulation coupling 
four simulators (SINCAL™, NS2, Open Track™, Aqua).73 In addition, the 
project included a study of the legal and economic aspects of carrying out 
simulation work and the potential business model for the simulation centre 
European Infrastructures Simulation and Analysis Centre (EISAC). The 
results of DIESIS are a very good starting point for future work in this 
direction.  
4.2.2 Mainstreaming CIP objectives into EU policy-making 
Protecting critical infrastructures requires constant attention to the 
consequences of policy actions in several fields. That said, how can one 
make sure that CIP policy is always kept in the picture when developing 
EU policies? There are three main ways to achieve this result in the years to 
come: 
• First, impact on CI could be introduced as a mandatory step in the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment system, whenever the policy issue 
at hand potentially affects, even if indirectly, the resilience or 
vulnerability of CIs. This way, Commission DGs in charge of 
proposing new policy initiatives would have to consider the impact 
on CIs at a very early policy stage, and this could guarantee a more 
balanced approach to EU policy-making.  
                                                     
73 See Stephan Pickl, presentation at the CEPS Task Force, 4th meeting, CEPS, 
Brussels.   
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• Second, new methodologies to stress-test existing policies (i.e. the 
‘stock’ rather than the ‘flow’ of rules) should be developed through 
public funding of ad hoc research projects. In particular, these projects 
should follow up on already funded projects to consolidate 
knowledge on how to model interdependencies between CIs and 
potential cascading effects triggered by failures of given 
infrastructures. A first attempt to achieve this result was already 
made by Luiijf et. al. (2006). 
• Third, indicators for the success of national and EU-wide 
information-sharing initiatives are needed. As observed by one of the 
Task Force participants, success criteria could include the level of 
senior engagement in the process, establishing a form of public- 
private partnership, coordinating a multi-agency approach, having an 
all-hazards understanding of risk, establishing clearly defined goals 
for risk management, and demonstrating a value to all stakeholders. 
But also parameters related to the estimated preparedness and 
response capacity of the member states will be needed in the years to 
come.  
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CHAPTER 4: MAIN FINDINGS 
• The key foundations of a CIP policy are a widely communicated vision 
and strategy, together with strong political commitment. The key pillars 
are then the development of standards and best practices, education 
and training, R&D and information-sharing, and modelling and EU-
wide simulation capabilities.  
• Trust is a key dimension in any CIP policy, but needs time, clear rules, 
sector-specific arrangements and a limited size of the PPP: this may 
create problems in international and EU cooperation efforts.  
• A thorough subsidiarity test should be run at an early stage to clearly 
identify areas where acting in common is more desirable, and areas that 
may remain under national competence in CIP, CIIP and for each of the 
sectors involved. 
• The EU must empower a single agency to deal with CIP and CIIP issues 
adopting an all-hazards approach; and launching an EU number for 
emergency management and early warning, located in the same 
agency. 
• The public-private partnership must be structured in a way that does 
not lead to an excessively large group, and is potentially structured on a 
sectoral basis. 
• The EU should promote the development and adoption of common risk 
metrics and standards for risk identification, assessment and 
management in the field of CIP, as well as the development of a mature 
insurance market. 
• The EU should adopt a flexible approach to CIP policy, by establishing 
through primary legislation only the general principles and main 
outcomes sought through EU CIP policy, and leaving it to the industry 
to devise the best technical measures that fulfil the desired levels of 
resilience.  
• CIP-related issues can be mainstreamed into the EU policy-making 
process in three main ways: i) including CIP impacts in the Impact 
Assessment Guidelines and in ex post evaluation; ii) developing 
methodologies for stress-testing EU policies in terms of their impact on 
critical infrastructure; iii) developing indicators to track the success of 
national and EU-wide information-sharing initiatives.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Alerts & Warnings. Information about NIS threats, disseminated by all 
possible means. Usually alerts & warnings must be accompanied by 
recommended actions the user should take to mitigate a threat arising 
on the internet. 
CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team). An organisation that 
studies computer and network security in order to provide incident 
response services to victims of attacks, to publish alerts concerning 
vulnerabilities and threats and to offer other information to help 
improve computer and network security. 
CSIRT (Computer Security and Incident Response Team). Another term 
for CERT. 
Culture of security. Awareness about NIS-related matters and the 
corresponding behaviour of internet users, defined by the OECD 
guidelines “Towards a culture of Security”. 
EISAS (European Information Sharing and Alert System). A placeholder 
for a yet-to-be determined role that the European Union can take in 
the area of sharing NIS information with citizens and SMEs. 
Describes a concept, not necessarily a physical system. 
ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) is an 
agency of the European Union created in 2004 by EU Regulation No 
460/2004 and fully operational since 1st September 2005. The 
objective of ENISA is to improve network and information security in 
the European Union.  
Hacker. A person who studies and explores software and systems with the 
aim of finding the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that allow him/her 
to break into remote computers. 
Home-users. In the context of this study, a generic group of people who 
use the internet at home, as a tool, without deep knowledge about 
how it works. 
NIS. Abbreviation for Network and Information Security. 
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Sensor network. A system using sensors to gather overall information 
about the current state of the network. A sensor is usually a computer 
system or a packet routing device connected to a network that collects 
information about data traffic in the segment to which it is connected. 
SME. Small (fewer than 50 employees) and Medium (fewer than 250 
employees) Enterprises. The numbers vary in the various member 
states. A more precise term would be ‘micro businesses’. 
Virus. Malicious code that might replicate itself and infect other computers 
with the help of a user (i.e. opening an e-mail or an attachment). 
Vulnerability. Weakness in software or hardware or its configuration that 
may lead to a break-in or otherwise compromise the security of a 
system. 
Worm. Malicious code that replicates itself and infects other computers 
without the interaction of a user. 
XML (Extensible Markup Language). A data format widely used to 
facilitate the sharing of different types of data. 
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Financial Services: the Parsifal Glossary74 
The glossary lists top-level concepts coming from different areas of 
expertise in CIP. Some of them are very technical, including those from 
CIIP common methodology. Others are closer to finance business players 
or supervisors. This glossary regroups concepts by ‘proximity’. Proximity 
may arise from hierarchical relationship (father-son, whole-part, derivation 
or extension). It may also result from the attachment of a concept to a 
specific area. 
Top & Level 1 Categories of Parsifal Glossary 
 
 
                                                     
74 J.-Yves Gresser, Draft Ontology Of Financial Risks & Dependencies Within & 
Outside The Financial Sector, Vol. 2, D2.1 Parsifal Projects, http://www.parsifal-
project.eu/images/PublicDeliverables/parsifal%20d2.1%20draft%20ontology%20o
f%20financial%20risks%20and%20dependencies%20within%20and%20outside%20
the%20financial%20sector.pdf 
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